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Another Limit on Federal Court Jurisdiction?  
Immigrant Access to Class-Wide Injunctive Relief
Abstract
This article examines a statute that may embody another limit on the power of the 
federal courts.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA) implemented sweeping changes that substantially restrict federal court 
review of administrative immigration decisions.  One provision implemented as a part of 
IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), appears, at least at first glance, to prohibit courts from 
issuing class-wide injunctive relief in immigration cases.  Such a restriction would be 
significant because federal courts have issued class-wide injunctions in the past to stop 
unconstitutional immigration practices and policies of the federal government.  The 
Supreme Court has not yet directly interpreted section 1252(f)(1).  Taking a closer look at 
the text of this provision in the context of relevant Supreme Court precedent, this article 
suggests that the provision may not impose a broad bar against the use of class-wide 
injunctive relief in the immigration context.  In addition, if the Court interprets this 
provision to broadly restrict class-wide injunctive relief, this article examines whether 
habeas corpus jurisdiction may provide an alternative means to obtain such relief.  
Ultimately, resolution of the effect of this provision will implicate the ongoing scholarly 
debate over the constitutionality and propriety of congressional restrictions of federal 
court review.
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1I. Introduction
Congressional attempts to limit federal court jurisdiction over controversial issues 
are not innovative,1 and the scholarly debate addressing the constitutionality of such 
attempts dates back many years.2  In the past, the scholarly debate anticipated future 
1
 For discussion of the history of congressional proposals to limit federal court review, 
including proposals to limit federal court review in the areas of abortion, school prayer, 
school bussing, immigration and prisoner’s rights, see Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional 
Control Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts:  A New Threat to James Madison’s 
Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417, 427 (2000) [hereinafter Congressional Control]; 
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:  An 
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 896-97 (1984); 
Stephan O. Kline, Judicial Independence:  Rebuffing Congressional Attacks on the Third 
Branch, 87 KY. L.J. 679, 738 -40 (1999).
2 See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts:  An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Lawrence Gene Sager, 
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to regulate the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional 
Gerrymandering:  Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question:  
An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207 
(1984) [hereinafter The Price of Asking]; Gunther, supra note 1; Akhil Reed Amar, A 
Neo-Federalist View of Article III:  Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 
B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Kline, supra note 1; Anderson, Congressional Control, supra, 
2possibilities.3  What if Congress eliminated Supreme Court review of certain claims?  
What if Congress denied access to federal courts to a particular group?  In the 1990’s, the 
conditional nature of these questions diminished.  One of the pieces of legislation that 
cemented the practicality of such questions is the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
note 1.  For articles treating this issue by focusing on immigration issues, see Erwin 
Chemerinsky, A Framework for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Restrictions on 
Federal Court Jurisdiction in Immigration Cases, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 295 (1999); David 
Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty:  Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on 
Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481 (199 8) [hereinafter 
Jurisdiction and Liberty]; Hart, supra; Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in 
Congress and the Courts:  Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615 
(2000); M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review—A Nice Thing?  Article III, Separation of 
Powers and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
29 CONN. L. REV. 1525 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration 
Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1882 n.125 (2000) [hereinafter Federal Courts Issues in 
Immigration Law]. 
3
 For example, the 1980’s wave of court-stripping scholarship evolved in response to 
proposed legislation that aimed to limit federal court jurisdiction regarding controversial 
issues such as abortion, school prayer and school bussing.  None of these bills became 
law.  Anderson, Congressional Control, supra note 1, at 418.  In 1984, Professor 
Chemerinsky acknowledged the argument that “Congress, rarely, if ever, would use its 
power to restrict federal court jurisdiction,” and prophetically wrote:  “But it is not at all 
certain that Congress would refrain from enacting such laws.”  Chemerinsky, The Price 
of Asking, supra note 2, at 1219-20.
3Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.4  IIRIRA contains many limits on court 
review,5 and the federal courts are still grappling with the boundaries and meanings of its 
restrictions.6
One restriction implemented through IIRIRA that the Supreme Court has yet to 
directly interpret, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), may limit the ability of the federal courts to 
grant class-wide injunctive relief in immigration cases.  The exact meaning and effect of 
4
 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996) (Division C).  
Other examples include the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), through which Congress eliminated the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
over certain habeas decisions of the courts of appeals.  Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996).  
Also, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which limited 
a federal court’s ability to fashion relief in suits brought by prisoners. Omnibus 
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134 (1995) 
(Title VIII).  For a discussion of these laws in the context of the debate over 
congressional control of federal court jurisdiction, see Anderson, Congressional Control, 
supra note 1, at 435-44.  Another timely (but not yet enacted) example of legislation 
asserting Congressional control over federal court jurisdiction is a bill passed by the 
House of Representatives that would limit federal court jurisdiction over legal questions 
brought under the Defense of Marriage Act.  H.R. 3313, 108th Congress (July 22, 2004).
5
 IIRIRA attacks court review through three main fronts.  First, IIRIRA contains 
provisions that restrict the issues that a court may review.  Second, IIRIRA contains 
provisions that restrict the timing of an action.  Third, the legislation also affects the 
permissible form of an action challenging an administrative immigration adjudication.
6 See part III, infra.
4the section, however, is uncertain.  Analysis of this statutory section is important because 
federal courts have issued class-wide injunctive relief in the past to stop unconstitutional 
immigration policies and practices of the federal government.  Because the power to 
regulate immigration is a federal matter,7 if this statute bars the federal courts from 
issuing class-wide injunctive relief, no court would have the power to grant that relief. 
By analyzing both the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) and relevant Supreme Court 
precedent, this article will attempt to decipher the meaning of section 1252(f)(1).8  This 
article also considers whether habeas jurisdiction is a viable alternative method to obtain 
class-wide injunctive relief if section 1252(f)(1) bars such relief.
II. Previous Use of Immigration Class Actions  
a. To Begin, an Example
Faced with thousands of applications for benefits to adjudicate, how can a federal 
agency with limited resources reduce its backlog?  One strategy is to implement an 
accelerated processing program and to discourage the filing of new applications.  If the 
agency spends less time adjudicating each application and intake slows, the backlog will 
shrink.  This strategy can cause extreme human consequences, however, if, for example, 
7 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (“For reasons long recognized as valid, 
the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien 
visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.”)
8
 This article reserves the question of the constitutionality of the statute in favor of first 
focusing on its meaning and effect.
5the benefit sought is asylum based on an applicant’s fear of returning to their country of 
origin.  
The immigration service, 9 faced with a backlog of 6-7,000 asylum applications, 
followed the above approach and implemented an accelerated processing program to 
dispense with the backlog.10  Immigration judges, administrative judges who preside over 
immigration hearings, held approximately 18 individual hearings per day.11   Immigration 
9
 Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS), located within the Department of Justice, administered 
the immigration laws of the United States.  With the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security, the functions of the INS were broken up into new organizations.  The 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), which administers benefit 
programs, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which controls enforcement 
and detention issues, and United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are new 
separate entities that reside within the Department of Homeland Security.  Control over 
the administrative appeal process remains within the Department of Justice.  See
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002).  For simplicity, this article 
will use the term “immigration service” to generally refer to the entities that administer 
the immigration laws.
10
 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1029-31 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
11
 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1031.  Under the accelerating processing 
program, the Miami district office of the immigration service processed asylum 
applications “at an unprecedented rate.”  Id. at 1031.
6judges afforded applicants ten days to compile and file a written claim for asylum.12  The 
immigration service conducted asylum interviews at a rate of forty per day and limited 
each interview to one-half hour.13  At the rate of forty interviews per day, there was a 
shortage of attorneys available to represent the applicants who desired counsel.14  During 
the accelerated program, the immigration service granted asylum to not one applicant.15
In response to a class action lawsuit filed challenging the accelerated processing 
program, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,
concluded that the program deprived its applicants of due process of law.16  The court 
affirmed the district court’s class-wide injunction to the extent it ordered the immigration 
service to re-process the applications in a manner consistent with due process.17
12
 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1031.  The district court determined that the 
preparation of one asylum application required between ten to forty hours of attorney 
work time.  Id. at 1032.  Given the number of applicants desiring counsel and the number 
of available attorneys, the district court determined that a ten-day time frame was 
impossible. Id. at 1031-32.
13
 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1031.
14
 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1031.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that the immigration service “had knowingly made it impossible for 
[applicants] and their attorneys to prepare and file asylum applications in a timely 
manner.”  Id. at 1031-32.
15
 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1032.
16
 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1040.
17
 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1041.
7What if the federal courts had no power to issue such class-wide relief?  This 
question is not hypothetical, as access to class-wide injunctive relief in the immigration 
context is uncertain after the enactment of IIRIRA. 
b. Why a Class Action?
Class action lawsuits filed against the immigration service over time have 
presented serious objections to the immigration service’s administration of the 
immigration laws.18  As in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, immigration class action 
litigation seeks to change a pattern of agency behavior, whether nationwide or across an 
administrative region.  Immigration class actions of the past can be grouped into three 
major categories.  The first major group is those actions challenging the fact of or 
conditions attached to immigration detention,19 including the treatment of detained 
18
 It is beyond the scope of this article to judge the behavior of the immigration service, or 
to investigate the reasons behind its alleged deficiencies.  Also, while these class actions 
have presented serious objections to immigration service practices and procedures, not all 
of these cases have found success on their merits.
19
 The immigration service has the power to detain many classes of foreign nationals, and 
the power to detain is not restricted to foreign nationals who have committed crimes.  
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (mandating detention of a broad class of foreign 
nationals); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (authorizing detention of a foreign national pending a 
removal decision).  This is important to understand, given that immigration detention 
often means incarceration in a state or federal prison.
8juveniles and adults.20  The second major group is those actions challenging the manner 
in which the immigration service implements immigration benefit programs demanded by 
Congress,21 including the asylum program. 22  The third major category is composed of 
20 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (addressing class action challenging the 
detention of juveniles, the Supreme Court determined that the immigration service had 
not violated due process standards); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 02-CV-2307, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 14537 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2004) (addressing discovery issues in a class action 
challenging post-September 11 detention of foreign nationals); Kazarov v. Achim, No. 
02-C-5097, 2003 WL 22956006 (N.D. Ill. December 12, 2003) (certifying class 
challenging detention of those ordered but not yet removed from the United States); 
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (certifying class challenging 
detention of Mariel Cubans).  Also, in 2002, a class action lawsuit was filed challenging 
the immigration service’s detention of foreign nationals subject to a special registration 
program that required registration at immigration service offices within the United States.  
See Elaine Monaghan, Muslims Sue US Over Mass Arrests, THE TIMES (London), 
December 26, 2002.
21 See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (determining that 
statute restricting judicial review of agency legalization determinations did not bar class 
action challenges to the administration of the 1986 legalization program); Ngwanyia v. 
Ashcroft, 302 F. Supp.2d 1076 (D. Minn. 2004) (granting partial summary judgment to 
class challenging immigration service procedures in adjudicating permanent residence 
applications of those granted asylum and also challenging the procedures used in issuing 
documentation of work authorization to those granted asylum); Campos v. INS, 32 F. 
Supp.2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (denying, in part, the government’s motion to dismiss a 
9objections to the immigration service’s procedures in removing23 foreign nationals from 
the United States, including practices used to obtain waivers of the right to a hearing,24
class action complaint challenging naturalization procedures); Phillips v. Brock, 652 F. 
Supp. 1372 (D. Md. 1987), vacated as moot sub nom., Phillips v. McLaughlin, 854 F.2d 
673 (4th Cir. 1988) (certifying class contesting administrative rulings regarding the 
employment of foreign workers but granting summary judgment to the government).
22 See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992) (ordering 
district court to dismiss class action complaint challenging interdiction at sea 
procedures); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) 
(affirming district court’s class-wide injunction to the extent it ordered the immigration 
service to reprocess asylum applications); American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 
760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (approving settlement agreement between class of 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers and the government); Orantes-Hernandez v. 
Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (certifying provisional class of Salvadorans 
challenging asylum practices).
23
 Over time, federal immigration statutes have used different terminology to reflect the 
concepts of expulsion of a foreign national from inside the United States and of refusal to 
allow entry of a foreign national into the United States.  IIRIRA concluded official use of 
the two terms deportation (referring to the act of expulsion from) and exclusion (referring 
to the act of refusing admittance) and replaced the two concepts with an umbrella concept 
called “removal.”  
24 See, e.g., Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming certification of 
class challenging the immigration service’s procedures in obtaining waivers and also 
affirming that those procedures violated notions of due process); Perez-Funez v. 
10
the stop and seizure practices of the United States Border Patrol,25 practices used in 
immigration workplace enforcement raids26 and the immigration service’s alleged 
unauthorized use of confidential information.27
Scholars have discussed why class actions are preferable to individual actions to 
challenge these types of immigration service practices.28  An advantage of the class 
action device is that it allows for broad systematic reform.29  Due to its potentially broad 
INS, 611 F. Supp. 990 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (certifying class and granting preliminary 
injunction to class challenging the immigration service practice of obtaining waiver of a 
right to a hearing from unaccompanied minor foreign nationals). 
25 See, e.g., Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
26 See, e.g., International Molders’ and Allied Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 
102 F.R.D. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
27 See, e.g., Aparicio v. Blakeway, 302 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2002).
28 See Leti Volpp, Court-Stripping and Class-Wide Relief:  A Response to Judicial Review 
in Immigration Cases After AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 463, 469-71 (2000) [hereinafter 
Court-Stripping and Class-Wide Relief]; Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in 
Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1680-81; Robert Pauw, Judicial Review of “Pattern 
and Practice” Cases:  What to Do When the INS Acts Unlawfully, 70 WASH. L. REV.
779, 790-98 (1995); and Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions:  Procedural Means 
of Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 576 (1997).
29 See Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues, supra note 2, at 1681 (explaining 
“[w]hen classwide litigation leads to reform of systemic practices, the benefits may be 
shared with unrepresented aliens; when counsel prevails at the district court level in an 
individual case, [the immigration service] can yield for the occasion without acquiescing 
11
nature, a class action can give relief to individuals who otherwise might not realize they 
are entitled to relief.30  The government does not provide free counsel if a foreign 
national facing removal cannot afford to hire their own.31  This fact, combined with the 
enormous complexity of immigration law, means that many foreign nationals with valid 
challenges to the practices of the immigration service may never be able to articulate 
those claims; they may never even realize that their claims exist.32  A further advantage 
of using the class action device in the immigration context, and one that will be discussed 
below, is that it may be impossible to develop an adequate record to establish an unlawful 
agency pattern or practice through the adjudication of an individual immigration 
proceeding.33
in the legal principle more generally”).  Even if a claim is heard in an individual 
proceeding and a judgment against a practice of the immigration service is obtained, it is 
doubtful that this judgment would be of much value to other foreign nationals, given the 
restrictions presented by the doctrine of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel and the 
expense of bringing hundreds or thousands of lawsuits addressing the same legal issue.  
See Greenberg, supra note 28, at 578.
30 See Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1680-81.
31
 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (“In any removal proceedings . . . the person concerned shall have the 
privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel . . . as 
he shall choose”).
32 See Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1680-81.
33 See notes 47-49, infra.  For example, in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, the district 
court was able to effectively and efficiently gather necessary information about the 
12
c. The 1986 Legalization Cases
Perhaps the best-known (and longest lasting) immigration class action lawsuits 
were filed in the wake of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).  
These cases are examples of class litigation challenging the immigration service’s 
administration of a benefit program.  More importantly for the purpose of this article, the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of the review-limiting provisions of the legalization statute 
provide perspective on deciphering the meaning of the text of section 1252(f)(1) (created 
by IIRIRA, the 1996 act), which is also a review-limiting provision. 
Through IRCA, Congress created a program that allowed certain foreign nationals 
illegally present in the United States to legalize their immigration status.34  The 
legalization program had two main components.  The first component granted the 
accelerated processing program by analyzing the program as a whole, beyond the 
treatment of a single applicant.  
34
 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603 (1986).  In January 
2004, President George W. Bush initiated a policy discussion regarding the construction 
of a new temporary worker program with a legalization component.  Remarks by the 
President, President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program (January 7, 2004), 
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html.  When 
framing any new legalization program, it is important to review the immigration service’s 
implementation of the 1986 legalization program and also the subsequent legal 
challenges.  
13
opportunity to apply for permanent residence status35 to foreign nationals who had 
entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and who had illegally and continuously 
resided in the United States since that date.36  The second component applied to foreign 
national agricultural workers who had resided in the United States for at least one year 
prior to May 1, 1986 and who had also performed at least 90 days of qualifying 
agricultural work during that same period.37  Agricultural workers who qualified under 
the second component were deemed “special agricultural workers” (SAW) and also were 
permitted to apply for permanent residence.  
Several class action lawsuits were filed challenging the immigration service’s 
administration of the 1986 legalization program.38  In general, these lawsuits claimed that 
35
 More commonly known as “green card” status, permanent residents are not citizens of 
the United States, but hold more privileges than other foreign nationals in the United 
States, including unrestricted employment authorization and potentially infinite 
permission to reside in the United States.  For further discussion on the incidences of 
permanent resident status in the United States, see CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY 
MAILMAN AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§6.03, 6.05.
36
 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A).
37
 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1)(B).
38 See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993); McNary v. Haitian 
Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991); Aparicio v. Blakeway, 302 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 
2002); Immigrant Assistance Project of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor v. 
INS, 306 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2002); Ortiz v. Meissner, 179 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Proyecto San Pablo v. INS, 189 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 1999); Abdullah v. INS, 184 F.3d 
14
the immigration service, in administering the legalization program, excluded individuals 
from the program whom Congress intended to include.  The stakes were high, as the 
difference between inclusion and exclusion was permission to legally reside in the United 
States.
The Supreme Court ultimately addressed whether federal district courts even had 
jurisdiction over the legalization class action complaints.  McNary v. Haitian Refugee 
Center, Inc. and Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Reno, both class actions, now provide 
the structure for determining whether a federal district court has jurisdiction over a 
challenge to the administration of the 1986 legalization program.  
Under the general immigration judicial review statute that existed at the time of 
IRCA (the 1986 act), foreign nationals subject to deportation could only obtain judicial 
review of a final deportation order directly in the appropriate federal court of appeals.  
Case law existed, however, that allowed district courts to hear certain claims deemed 
related yet collateral to a “final order” outside of the direct court of appeals review 
process.39 Some courts of appeals had allowed district courts to hear challenges to 
immigration service practices even before the issuance of a final order.40
158 (2d Cir. 1999); Naranjo-Aguilera v. USINS, 30 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1994); Ayuda, 
Inc. v. Reno, 7 F.3d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
39 See, e.g., Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968).
40 See, e.g., National Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th 
Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 502 U.S. 183 (1991); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 
979-80 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Haitian Refugee 
Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1033 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); but see Ayuda, Inc. v. 
15
The jurisdictional debate surrounding the 1986 legalization statute stemmed from 
the identical special judicial review provisions applicable to both the long-term residence 
and SAW programs, which operated on top of the existing general rules regarding 
judicial review of immigration administrative actions.  The special provisions both state 
that “[t]here shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an 
application for adjustment of status [to permanent resident] under this section [the 
legalization program] except in accordance with this subsection.”41  Additionally, the 
sections provide that review of a denial under either legalization program is available 
only “in the judicial review of an order of deportation,” and that “[s]uch judicial review 
Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1336 (D.C. Cir 1989) (criticizing Haitian Refugee Center v. 
Smith).  For further information on the pre-1996 immigration judicial review process, see 
Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC:  Lessons from 
Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 415-17 (2000) [hereinafter Judicial Review 
in Immigration Cases After AADC] (discussing the historic practice of allowing non-final 
order review of collateral matters).  See also Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future:  
Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 1411, 1431-34 (1997) [hereinafter Back to the Future]; Pauw, supra note 28, at 779-
80.
41
 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(1) (long-term residence program); 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(1) (SAW 
program).
16
shall be based solely upon the administrative record established at the time of the review 
by the appellate [administrative] authority.”42
In McNary, the Supreme Court determined that the special judicial review 
provisions quoted above did not preclude federal district court jurisdiction “over an 
action alleging a pattern or practice of procedural due process violations by [the 
immigration service] in its administration of the SAW program.”43
42
 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(4)(A)-(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3)(A)-(B) (the SAW provision reads 
“in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or [emphasis added] deportation;” the 
long-term residence equivalent does not mention “exclusion” but is otherwise the same).  
43
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 483 (1991).  Because applicants 
would face deportation if not for the legalization program, the legalization statute 
shielded applicants with a firewall prohibiting the use of information garnered in the 
application process to deport the applicant.  8 U.S.C. § 1255a(C)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 
1160(b)(6).  A decision to deny a legalization application could be administratively 
appealed to a legalization appeals unit.  8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(2)(A).  
Because of the firewall, however, a legalization appeals unit denial did not automatically 
place an individual in deportation proceedings.  This protection presented a Catch-22 to 
individuals who desired federal court review of a legalization appeals unit denial.  As 
explained above, the legalization special review provision permitted judicial review of a 
decision of the legalization appeals unit “only in the judicial review of an order of 
deportation.”  As explained by the Supreme Court, “absent initiation of a deportation 
proceeding against an unsuccessful applicant, judicial review of such individual 
determinations was completely foreclosed.” McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 
U.S. at 486.
17
The McNary plaintiffs represented a class of foreign national agricultural workers 
“who either had been or would be injured by unlawful practices and policies adopted by 
[the immigration service] in its administration of the SAW program.”44  Among other 
specific challenges, the plaintiff class claimed that the immigration service refused SAW 
applicants opportunities to challenge adverse evidence and to present witnesses, that the 
immigration service did not provide effective translators and that adequate transcripts of 
legalization interviews did not exist, thus inhibiting the effectiveness of administrative 
review.  The government argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the class 
action complaint because the legalization special judicial review scheme allows for 
judicial review only to individuals after the conclusion of an individual hearing in a court 
of appeals.45
To the contrary, the Supreme Court held that the district court did have 
jurisdiction over the class action complaint. The Supreme Court interpreted the 
legalization judicial review scheme to only apply to “determination[s] respecting an 
application.”  The Court determined that the McNary class was not challenging “a 
determination respecting an application,” but was instead making “general collateral 
challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing 
applications.”46  Because of the nature of the challenge, the case fell outside of the special 
legalization judicial review structure, and district court jurisdiction was appropriate. 
44
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 487.
45
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 491.
46
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 492.
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The Court concluded that to deny district court review of pattern and practice 
collateral challenges would be the “practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review 
of generic constitutional and statutory claims.”47  Even if a foreign national subjected 
themselves to a deportation proceeding, and then sought judicial review, the Court 
concluded the reviewing court of appeals would be in a poor position to adjudicate 
constitutional pattern and practice claims based on the administrative record of an 
individual legalization application.48  The Court doubted that a court of appeals would 
have adequate fact-finding powers to determine whether a pattern of unlawful practice 
was occurring in the context of an individual case.49  The Supreme Court also reasoned 
that if Congress had intended the legalization special judicial review provision to apply 
beyond appeal of individual determinations to pattern and practice litigation, Congress 
could have used broader statutory language to clearly express that intent.50
The significance of McNary became muddled, however, with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Reno v. Catholic Social Services.  Decided two and a half years after 
47
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 497.
48
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 497.  See also Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. 
Supp. 608, 615 (S.D. Fla. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 180 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 
1999) (following McNary, the court discussed the need for district court review of claims 
for which an adequate record is not created during the administrative process).
49
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 497.  
50
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 494.  The Supreme Court provided
an example of such broader language, stating that Congress could have worded the statute 
to block judicial review of “all causes” relating to the legalization program.
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McNary, Catholic Social Services concerned the long-term illegal resident component of 
the 1986 legalization program.  To be eligible for the program, Congress required several 
conditions be met.  The applicant must have entered the United States before January 1, 
1982 and also must prove illegal continuous residence in the United States since at least 
that date.51  The applicant must also show continuous physical presence in the United 
States since November 6, 1986.52  The foreign national must have also submitted a 
legalization application during a one-year application period.53
The legalization statute elaborates that “brief, casual, and innocent” absences are 
permissible under the continuous physical presence requirement.54  The immigration 
service, however, regulated that such brief, casual and innocent absences would bar the 
establishment of continuous physical presence if the individual had not obtained travel 
permission from the immigration service prior to travel.55  Regarding the illegal 
continuous residence requirement, the immigration service regulated that that 
requirement would not be satisfied if the foreign national had left the United States and 
re-entered by presenting “facially valid” documentation, despite that the statute allowed 
for brief trips abroad.56  To further complicate matters, the immigration service reversed 
its interpretation of the illegal continuous residence requirement seven months into the 
51
 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A).
52
 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(A).
53
 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(A).
54
 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(B).
55
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 47 (1993) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(g)).
56
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc. 509 U.S. at 50; 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(2)(A).
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one-year application period.57  In both lawsuits that were consolidated into Catholic 
Social Services, a district court judge invalidated the immigration service’s interpretation 
of the statutory terms and extended the one-year filing period to allow for applications by 
those discouraged by the immigration service’s interpretations of the statutory terms at 
issue.  
On appeal, the government argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction 
due to the legalization program’s special judicial review scheme.  According to the 
government, the immigration service’s interpretations of the illegal continuous residence 
and continuous physical presence requirements amounted to “determinations respecting 
an application” and were thus reviewable only during an individual hearing.  In response 
to this argument, the Supreme Court reemphasized that the statutory phrase “a 
determination” refers to a single act, not a group of decisions or a practice or procedure 
employed in making decisions.58  In this sense, the Court reaffirmed McNary by 
reiterating that the special legalization judicial review provision does not bar district court 
review of collateral pattern and practice challenges, including actions challenging the 
legality of a regulation implementing the legalization statute. 59
From there, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Social Services
diverges from McNary.  The Supreme Court held that while the legalization statute itself 
would not serve as a jurisdictional bar, the Catholic Social Services classes could not 
meet the ripeness justiciability standard required of all those seeking federal court review.  
57
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc. 509 U.S. at 50-51.
58 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 55-6 (1993).
59
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 56.
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The Court determined that the immigration service’s publication of its illegal continuous 
residence and continuous physical presence interpretations alone did not create a ripe 
claim.  The Court explained that the “claim would ripen only once [an applicant] took the 
affirmative steps that he could take before the INS blocked his path by applying the 
regulation to him.”60  Without those first affirmative steps, the Court reasoned, “one 
cannot know whether the challenged regulation actually makes a concrete difference to a 
particular alien until one knows that he will take those affirmative steps and will satisfy 
the other conditions.”61
However, the Court elaborated that if a challenged regulatory interpretation is 
detrimentally applied to an applicant and the applicant asserts their ripe claim, the 
applicant would be challenging “a determination.”  Thus, the special judicial review 
provision is triggered and district court review is precluded.  The Court explained that 
“Congress may well have assumed that, in the ordinary case, the courts would not hear a 
challenge to regulations specifying limits to eligibility before those regulations were 
actually applied to an individual, whose challenge to the denial of an individual 
application would proceed within the Reform Act’s limited scheme.”62  The Catholic 
Social Services class is different from the McNary class, the Court reasoned, because a 
Catholic Social Services class member could challenge the immigration service’s 
interpretation of the statutory terms in an individual deportation hearing, while a McNary
60
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 59.  
61
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 59 n.20.
62
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 60.
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class member could not adequately present their pattern or practice challenge in the 
context of an individual hearing.63
The Supreme Court left open the possibility of district court review, however, for 
Catholic Social Services class members subject to an alleged “front-desking” policy.  The 
immigration service instructed front desk clerks to review applications in the presence of 
the applicant.  If the clerk determined based on a facial review that the applicant is 
ineligible under the legalization statute, the instructions directed the clerk to refuse the 
application for filing and return it immediately to the applicant.64  Applicants subjected to 
this “front-desking” procedure held ripe claims because “front-desked” applicants would 
have felt the application of the challenged regulations “in a particularly concrete 
manner.”65  The “front-desked” applicant would also face a McNary-like deprivation of 
judicial review, according to the Court.  Because “front-desking” amounted only to an 
informal denial, the applicant could not file an administrative appeal.  Therefore, the 
Court reasoned, blocking district court review of applications refused at the front desk 
would effectively leave those applicants with no meaningful review.66  In Catholic Social 
Services, the Court left open the possibility that “front-desked” applicants could maintain 
a class action in a district court.67
63
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 60-61.
64
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 61-62.
65
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 63-64.
66
 Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 64.
67
 Section 377 of IIRIRA (the 1996 act) limited jurisdiction of claims brought under the 
1986 legalization act to those brought by individuals who had actually filed or had 
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Lower courts, in applying McNary and Catholic Social Services, have considered 
whether review would be available if it is not permitted in a district court.68  Lower courts 
have also emphasized the distinction between review of a challenge to “a determination” 
and review of a challenge to a widely employed practice or procedure.69
attempted to file applications, leaving those who had not even attempted to file 
applications (discouraged by stories of those subjected to “front-desking”) outside of the 
circle of jurisdiction.  However, the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (LIFE Act) of 
2000 repealed section 377 of IIRIRA with regard to certain legalization class members.  
Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 1104 (2000) (Title XI).
68 See, e.g., Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming denial of class 
certification, among other reasons, where denial “would not foreclose all forms of 
meaningful judicial review”).
69
 For example, the Ninth Circuit deduced two guiding principles from McNary and 
Catholic Social Services.  The first principle is that a district court can review a 
legalization procedure or practice of the immigration service, collateral to substantive 
adjudication, provided that the claim is ripe.  The second is that challenges to the 
immigration service’s interpretation or application of substantive criteria may only occur 
within the confines of the legalization program’s special judicial review structure (only 
during review of a final order of deportation).  Proyecto San Pablo v. INS, 189 F.3d 
1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ortiz v. Meissner, 179 F.3d 718, 720-23 (9th Cir. 
1999)).  For other lower court decisions applying McNary and Catholic Social Services, 
see, for example, Aparicio v. Blakeway, 302 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2002); Immigrant 
Assistance Project of the Los Angeles County of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 
24
Still relying on the framework of McNary and Catholic Social Services, some of 
the class action cases challenging the administration of the 1986 legalization program 
settled in 2004.  For example, on January 21, 2004, a district court entered an order 
approving a settlement between the Catholic Social Services travel permission class 
(challenging the continuous residence requirement) and the immigration service.70
According to the agreement, the immigration service will provide a new one-year 
application period for those individuals who appeared to apply for legalization but were 
told that they were ineligible because they had traveled abroad without obtaining advance 
permission from the immigration service.71
The special judicial review provisions of the legalization program represented a 
big challenge to the availability of class-wide relief in the immigration context. Both 
McNary and Catholic Social Services are important lessons in the Supreme Court’s 
review of immigration statutes potentially limiting the form of a federal court action. 
McNary and Catholic Social Services, however, concerned “special” judicial review 
statutes that were aberrations from the norm.  As explained above, at the time of McNary, 
courts had held that the “regular” judicial review scheme underlying the “special” judicial 
2002); Abdullah v. INS, 184 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 1999); Naranjo-Aguilera v. U. S. INS, 30 
F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1994); Ayuda, Inc. v., Reno, 7 F.3d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
70
 Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc. v. Ridge, No. S-86-1343 (E.D. Ca. January 23, 2004) (Order 
Approving Settlement of Class Action).
71
 Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc. v. Ridge, No. S-86-1343 (E.D. Ca. January 23, 2004) (Joint 
Stipulation Regarding Settlement at ¶ 4, attached to Order Approving Settlement of Class 
Action).
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review scheme of the legalization program allowed for pattern and practice class action 
challenges in a district court before the issuance of an administrative final order.  IIRIRA, 
the 1996 law, presents an even bigger challenge, because IIRIRA fundamentally changed 
the underlying review scheme.  IIRIRA raises the question whether the “regular” system 
still allows for class-wide injunctive relief in the immigration context.  
III. Major Review-Limiting Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
As described by many commentators, the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) drastically remodeled the Immigration 
and Nationality Act.72  A major theme of IIRIRA is the curtailment of court review of 
administrative action in enforcing the immigration laws.  IIRIRA transformed the 
Immigration and Nationality Act by deleting the existing review provisions and adding 
section 1252, “Judicial review of orders of removal.”  Because IIRIRA is so complex, 
and its review-limiting provisions are interrelated, it is necessary to describe IIRIRA’s 
major restrictions and the Supreme Court’s treatment of these restrictions so far before 
any discussion of a specific provision of IIRIRA.
72 See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, The New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233 (1988); Benson, Back to the Future, supra note 40; Lucas 
Guttentag, The Immigration Act: Federal Court Jurisdiction-Statutory Restrictions and 
Constitutional Rights, 1209 PLI/CORP 81, 81-98 (2000).
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Section 1252 carves out a wide selection of substantive matters not subject to 
judicial review.  These matters include a decision to execute expedited removal73 against 
a foreign national,74 certain decisions involving discretionary acts of government 
officials75 and decisions to remove foreign nationals convicted of committing certain 
73Expedited removal is a concept added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by 
IIRIRA.  Expedited removal permits border officers to enforce the immediate removal of 
certain individuals.  If a border officer determines that a foreign national is inadmissible 
into the United States due to fraud or due to a lack of appropriate documentation, the 
officer can order the removal of the individual “without further hearing or review.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).  The border officer cannot order expedited removal, however, 
if the individual expresses intent to apply for asylum or expresses fear of persecution, and 
the border officer determines that the individual possesses a credible fear of persecution.  
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).  The applicant may seek 
administrative review of an adverse credible fear determination, but the individual is 
detained while awaiting this administrative review.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III)-
(IV).  For more information about the expedited removal process, see CHARLES GORDON, 
STANLEY MAILMAN AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 
64.06.
74
 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e).
75
 According to IIRIRA, “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” any decision whether 
to grant a waiver of statutory provisions demanding removal of certain foreign nationals 
with criminal histories, any decision whether to grant cancellation of removal, any 
decision whether to grant voluntary departure or any decision whether to adjust an 
individual’s status to legal permanent residence.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  
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crimes.76  A further substantive restriction on review contained in IIRIRA is section 
1252(g), which provides:  “Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or 
on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien 
under this chapter.”  
In addition to substantive restrictions, section 1252 contains a timing restriction.  
Section 1252(b)(9), entitled “Consolidation of questions for judicial review,” states: 
“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application 
of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding 
Additionally, IIRIRA prevents judicial review of “any other decision or action of the 
Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the 
discretion of the Attorney General other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) 
of this title.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).  Section 1158(a) refers to a decision whether 
to grant asylum.  
76
 IIRIRA prohibits judicial review of a final removal order based on the commission of a 
crime of moral turpitude, an aggravated felony or a controlled substance crime, among 
other crimes.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  For further information on criminal bases for 
removal, including what constitutes a crime of moral turpitude and an aggravated felony, 
see CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 63.03, 71.05.  
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brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be 
available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.”77
There are two form-restricting provisions in section 1252 that may affect the use 
of multi-party litigation.  Regarding expedited removal, IIRIRA provides that “no court 
may -- certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in any of the 
narrow instances where the statute permits judicial review of expedited removal issues.78
77
 This provision is reminiscent of the “special” judicial review provision in McNary, and 
also implicates the use of pattern and practice litigation.  In fact, Professor Motomura has 
compared McNary to section 1252(b)(9).  Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After 
AADC, supra note 40, at 434-38.  He argues that the reasoning of McNary survives 
section 1252(b)(9) and that section 1252(b)(9) should be narrowly construed to allow for 
district court jurisdiction over pre-final order pattern and practice litigation.  Judicial 
Review After AADC, supra note 40, at 434-38. A further potential challenge to pattern 
and practice litigation is section 1252(d), which requires exhaustion of administrative 
remedies before a court may review a “final order” of removal.  Professor Motomura 
argues that the exhaustion requirement should not apply to pattern and practice litigation 
because such matters are independent from a “final order” of removal. Judicial Review 
in Immigration Cases After AADC, supra note 40, at 440-41.
78
 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B).  IIRIRA provides for extremely limited habeas corpus review 
of expedited removal decisions, and IIRIRA allowed for judicial review of the 
constitutionality of the expedited removal program only in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia and only if the lawsuit challenging the program was filed no later 
than 60 days after the program was first implemented.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3).
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The second form-restricting provision is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which is entitled “Limit 
on injunctive relief.”  The section reads:
(1) In general
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or 
parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have 
jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of 
part IV of this subchapter,79 as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the 
application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom 
proceedings under such part have been initiated.
Over eight years since the passage of IIRIRA, federal courts are still debating the 
meaning and effect of many of its review-limiting provisions.  The Supreme Court has 
directly addressed two major review-limiting issues, but the Court has not yet directly 
addressed the effect of the timing provision (section 1252(b)(9)) or the form-limiting 
section 1252(f)(1).  
The Supreme Court first considered section 1252(g).  In Reno v. American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee,80 a group of Palestinians brought a selective prosecution 
79
 “Part IV of this subchapter” refers to the part entitled “Inspection, Apprehension, 
Examination, Exclusion, and Removal,” and is comprised of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1231.  
80
 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).  For in-
depth discussion of this litigation and issues raised in this case, see, for example, David 
Martin, On Counterintuitive Consequences and Choosing the Right Control Group:  A 
Defense of Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 363 (2000); Motomura, Judicial Review 
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claim against the immigration service.  The Court adopted a narrow interpretation of 
section 1252(g), determining that it restricts review of only three discrete actions, the 
decision or action to (1) commence proceedings; (2) adjudicate cases; or (3) execute 
removal orders.81  Rejecting the immigration service’s argument that 1252(g) applies to 
“the universe of deportation claims,” the Court explained that 1252(g) would bar only a 
pre-final order82 challenge to the immigration service’s exercise of discretion with respect 
to the three discrete acts mentioned in the statute.83  The Court determined that federal 
in Immigration Cases After AADC, supra note 40, at 393-95; Gerald L. Neuman, 
Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment after Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 313 (2000).  For discussion of the role of this Supreme Court decision in the 
ongoing debate over congressional control of federal court jurisdiction, see Anderson, 
Congressional Control, supra note 1, at 436-37.
81
 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 482.
82
 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 483. Section 1252(g) 
prevents review of those three acts “[e]xcept as provided in this section.”  Theoretically, 
if a foreign national is eligible for judicial review under section 1252, a court would have 
jurisdiction over a claim challenging any of the three acts mentioned in section 1252(g) 
when reviewing a final order pursuant to section 1252.  The plaintiffs in American-Arab 
were seeking pre-final order review in a district court.
83
 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 482.
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courts lack pre-final order jurisdiction over selective prosecution claims as the claim 
involves the discrete act whether to commence proceedings.84
In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed whether IIRIRA’s review-limiting 
provisions foreclosed habeas corpus actions in the federal district courts.  INS v. St. Cyr85
concerned a habeas petition challenging the retroactive application of IIRIRA’s 
elimination of a type of deportation waiver.  Mr. St. Cyr pled guilty to a deportable crime 
before IIRIRA’s enactment, during the existence of a waiver that would have allowed 
him to remain in the United States despite his plea.  IIRIRA eliminated the waiver for 
which Mr. St. Cyr would have been eligible.86
The immigration service argued in St. Cyr that no federal court had jurisdiction to 
consider Mr. St. Cyr’s claim that the pre-IIRIRA waiver should apply to him.  The 
Supreme Court concluded that if it accepted the immigration service’s argument, 
individuals like Mr. St. Cyr would be left without any judicial forum to bring challenges 
consisting of pure questions of law.  The Court determined that “the absence of such a 
forum, coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of 
congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of such an important 
question of law, strongly counsels against adopting a construction that would raise 
84
 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 487.  The Court 
determined that the doctrine of constitutional doubt played no role in the case before it 
because “an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective 
enforcement as a defense against his deportation.” Id. at 488 (1999).
85
 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
86
 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292-93.
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serious constitutional questions.”87  Emphasizing the historical difference between 
judicial review and habeas corpus review of immigration administrative actions,88 the 
Court concluded that no part of IIRIRA “speaks with sufficient clarity to bar jurisdiction 
pursuant to the general habeas statute.”89  “At no point . . . does IIRIRA make express 
reference to § 2241.”90  Therefore, the Court concluded that habeas jurisdiction survived 
IIRIRA.91
87
 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314.
88
 The Court explained that judicial review and habeas review are two distinct, co-existing 
concepts in immigration law.  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 311-13.  Originally, a habeas 
petition was the sole method to seek federal court review of administrative immigration 
decisions.  In 1961, Congress enacted a judicial review statute that supplemented the 
existing habeas review with a petition for review process with a petition directly filed in 
the appropriate court of appeals.  See Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases 
After AADC, supra note 40, at 395-96.  While IIRIRA revamped “judicial review” of 
immigration administrative actions, the Court concluded that the provisions of IIRIRA at 
issue in St. Cyr did not also revamp “habeas review.”  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313-14.  
89
 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 312-13.
90
 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 312 n.36.  In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that “[t]he 
Court today finds ambiguity in the utterly clear language of a statute that forbids the 
district court (and all other courts) to entertain the claims of aliens such as respondent St. 
Cyr, who have been found deportable by reason of their criminal acts.  It fabricates a 
superclear statement, ‘magic words’ requirement for the congressional expression of such 
an intent, unjustified in law and unparalleled in any other area of our jurisprudence.”  INS 
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court has yet to directly address the meaning and effect of section 
1252(f)(1), but commentators (including the Supreme Court in dicta) have described this 
section as a limitation on the issuance of class-wide injunctions.92  The next section will 
analyze the statutory text of section 1252(f)(1), and using McNary, Catholic Social 
Services and St. Cyr as guides, attempt to parse out its effect.
IV. Deciphering 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)
While the Supreme Court has yet to directly interpret section 1252(f)(1), the 
Court gave brief mention to the entire section 1252(f) in American-Arab.  In that case, the 
Court rejected the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s determination that section 
91
 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 312-14.  For further discussion of St. Cyr and its underlying 
issues, see, e.g., Lee Gelernt, The 1996 Immigration Legislation and the Assault on the 
Courts, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 455 (2001); Daniel Kanstroom, St Cyr or Insincere?  The 
Strange Quality of Supreme Court Victory, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413 (2002); David A. 
Martin, Behind the Scenes on a Different Set:  What Congress Needs to Do in the 
Aftermath of St. Cyr and Nguyen, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313 (2002); Gerald L. Neuman, 
Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1963 (2000).
92
 Reno v. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1999); 
Benson, Back to the Future, supra note 40, at 1454; Nancy Morawetz, Predicting the 
Meaning of INA § 242(b)(9), 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 453, 454 (2000); Neuman, Federal 
Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1679; Volpp, Court-Stripping and 
Class-Wide Relief, supra note 28, at 468.
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1252(f) contains an independent, affirmative grant of jurisdiction.  The Court stated in 
dicta:
Even respondents scarcely try to defend the Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 
1252(f) as a jurisdictional grant.  By its plain terms, and even by its title, 
that provision is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief.  It 
prohibits federal courts from granting class-wide injunctive relief against 
the operation of §§ 1221-1231, but specifies that this ban does not extend 
to individual cases.  To find in this an affirmative grant of jurisdiction is to 
go beyond what the language will bear.93
But what, exactly, is the effect of section 1252(f)(1)? Does it indeed prohibit “federal 
courts from granting class-wide injunctive relief against the operation of §§ 1221-1231?”  
If so, what does it mean to prohibit class-wide injunctive relief “against the operation” of 
those statutory provisions?  It will be helpful here to review the exact language of section 
1252(f)(1):
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the 
party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme 
Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the 
operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter, as amended by 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an 
93
 Reno v. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 481-82 (1999) 
(Scalia, J.).
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individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been 
initiated.94
a. Textual Review
Reading the text of section 1252(f)(1) itself, it is not obvious what the section 
bars.  A closer intrinsic review of the statutory section alone may cause the Supreme 
Court to backtrack from its dicta in American-Arab that the section “prohibits federal 
courts from granting class-wide injunctive relief against the operation of §§ 1221-
1231.”95  To be sure, the title of section 1252(f) (“Limit on injunctive relief”) suggests 
some sort of limit on injunctive relief, but under what circumstances is not clear. 96
94
 The immigration service has not issued any regulations interpreting section 1252(f)(1).
95
 Reno v. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 481.
96
 The general title of section 1252 (“Judicial review of orders of removal”) only adds 
further uncertainty.  Courts have struggled with the question whether section 1252 as a 
whole applies only in the context of removal proceedings, or whether its provisions also 
apply to immigration service actions that are not a part of removal proceedings. The 
immigration service performs many functions that do not necessarily involve the 
institution of removal proceedings, including the administration of benefit programs 
(such as adjudicating asylum applications, applications for permanent residency and 
applications for temporary visas).  Whether section 1252 applies to review of these types 
of administrative actions is unsettled.  See, e.g., Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S., 345 
F.3d 683, 692 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing but declining to reach the issue of whether 
section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies outside the context of removal proceedings); CDI 
Information Serv., Inc. v. Reno, 278 F.3d 616, 618-20 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that 
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The text of section 1252(f)(1) is self-limiting in several ways.  Remember, the 
section states that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or 
authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this 
subchapter” (emphasis added).  The meaning of this italicized phrase is critical in 
determining the scope of section 1252(f)(1).  Just as “a determination” was a critical term 
in McNary, section 1252(f)(1) has its own critical terms.
For example, “operation of” is a critical term in section 1252(f)(1).  What does it 
mean to enjoin or restrain the “operation of” the specified statutes?  This issue has 
already received some attention.  Courts have determined that to give effect to the 
inclusion of the term “operation of,” section 1252(f)(1) should be interpreted to mean that 
no court may issue class-wide injunctive relief eliminating the function of a statute, but 
that a court may issue class-wide injunctive relief to remedy the way in which the 
immigration service is causing a statute to function.97  In other words, to enjoin the 
“operation of” a statute is to completely foreclose its application in any instance, which is 
section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies beyond review of orders of removal); Samirah v. 
O’Connell, 335 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub. nom., Samirah v. 
Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2811 (2004) (same); Van Dinh v. Reno, 197 F.3d 427, 
432 (10th Cir. 1999) (same).
97
 Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2003); Grimaldo v. Reno, 187 F.R.D. 643, 
648 (D. Colo. 1999).
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an entirely different concept than issuing an injunction preventing the immigration 
service from implementing a statute in an impermissible manner.98
For example, a foreign national sought to amend his complaint to create a class 
action challenging the immigration service’s detention practices.  The class action 
complaint requested injunctive relief.  The district court held that section 1252(f)(1) did 
not affect the class action complaint because the complaint did not seek an injunction 
against the operation of the applicable sections, but rather sought “to enjoin alleged 
constitutional violations by [the immigration service] in its administration of [the statute] 
and/or its own regulations.”99
Similarly, in a case that arose prior to the effective date of IIRIRA, a district court 
speculated that section 1252(f)(1) does not apply to a situation where a class seeks to 
“enjoin constitutional violations and policies and practices.”100  The court recognized a 
distinction between an injunction preventing the operation of a statute and an injunction 
ordering implementation of a statute “under the appropriate standard.”101
The Ninth Circuit affirmed this approach in Ali v. Ashcroft, a case founded on a 
class action habeas petition seeking to enjoin the government from enforcing removal to 
98
 Professors Motomura, Neuman and Volpp have also discussed this concept.  See 
Judicial Review In Immigration Cases After AADC, supra note 40, at 439; Federal 
Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2,  at 1682-83; Court-Stripping and Class-
Wide Relief, supra note 28, at 473.
99
 Grimaldo v. Reno, 187 F.R.D. at 648.
100
 Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608, 618 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
101
 Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. at 618.
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Somalia because that country has no functioning central government.102  The Ninth 
Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that section 1252(f)(1) does not apply to 
class actions challenging the manner in which a statute is implemented.  Giving effect to 
the use of the term “operation of,” the Ninth Circuit explained that “1252(f)(1) limits the 
district court’s authority to enjoin [the immigration service] from carrying out legitimate 
removal orders.  Where, however, a petitioner seeks to enjoin conduct that allegedly is 
not even authorized by the statute, the court is not enjoining the operation of part IV of 
subchapter II, and § 1252(f)(1) therefore is not implicated.”103
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, perhaps inadvertently, lent 
support to this interpretation of section 1252(f)(1).  The Court stated, “[o]ne cannot come 
away from reading this section [section 1252] without having the distinct impression that 
Congress meant to allow litigation challenging the new system by, and only by, aliens 
against whom the new procedures had been applied.”104  Thus, challenges to the new 
102
 Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2003).  The Immigration and Nationality 
Act governs to which countries a foreign national may be removed.  8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(2)(E).  The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine “whether the 
Attorney General can remove an alien to one of the countries designated in [the 
governing section] without obtaining that country's acceptance of the alien prior to 
removal.”  Jama v. INS, 329 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1407 
(2004).
103
 Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d at 886.  
104
 American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352, 1359-60 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (emphasis added).  In American Immigration Lawyers Association v. Reno, the 
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system fall under section 1252(f)(1), but those challenges do not necessarily include 
challenges to the way the immigration service is implementing the new system.
The legislative history also supports the argument that “operation of” signifies 
that Congress meant only to block injunctive relief halting the functioning of the new 
system.  The House Committee Report for the House of Representatives version of 
IIRIRA, which contains an identical version of what became section 1252(f)(1), states 
that the purpose of section 1252(f) is to prevent single district courts or courts of appeals, 
but not the Supreme Court, from enjoining “the operation of the new removal procedures 
established in this legislation.  These limitations do not preclude challenges to the new 
procedures, but the procedures will remain in force while such lawsuits are pending.  In 
addition, courts may issue injunctive relief pertaining to the case of an individual alien, 
and thus protect against any immediate violation of rights.”105  This statement evidences 
that the House Committee was concerned that class-wide injunctions would bring the 
entire new system to a grinding halt.  This is a different issue from whether the 
immigration service is implementing the system consistent with the statute and the 
Constitution.
court held that organizational plaintiffs did not have standing to bring statutory or 
constitutional claims challenging the operation of IIRIRA’s expedited removal program.  
The court concluded that Congress “contemplated that lawsuits challenging its enactment 
would be brought, if it all, by individual aliens who —during the sixty-day period—were 
aggrieved by the statute’s implementation.”  Id. at 1359.
105 H.R. REP. NO. 104-469 (I) at 161 (1996).
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Thus, giving effect to the term “operation of” leads to an interpretation where 
courts may not issue injunctive relief challenging the legality of the whole system of 
review created by IIRIRA, but may issue injunctive relief preventing the immigration 
service from administering the system in an inappropriate manner.
Section 1252(f)(1) is also self-limiting in that only the “operation of” part IV is 
implicated.  Part IV is entitled “Inspection, Apprehension, Examination, Exclusion, and 
Removal,” and encompasses sections 1221 through 1231.  This part contains many 
important provisions, including provisions governing expedited removal, arrest of foreign 
nationals, release pursuant to bond, detention of foreign nationals, determinations as to 
who is removable from the United States, the procedures to be employed during removal 
proceedings, cancellation of removal,106 voluntary departure,107 and the procedures to be 
employed in actually removing foreign nationals from the United States (including 
detention pending removal).  There are many important administrative functions 
authorized by statutes residing outside of part IV, however.  If a case involves a function 
authorized outside of part IV, section 1252(f)(1) should not apply.  In fact, plaintiffs 
106
 Cancellation of removal allows for waiver of removal in very narrow circumstances.  
For further discussion of cancellation of removal, see CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY 
MAILMAN AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.04.
107
 Voluntary departure is a procedure through which an immigration judge allows a 
foreign national ordered removed to voluntarily depart from the United States during a 
specified time frame.  For further discussion of voluntary departure, see CHARLES 
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 64.05.
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continue to bring class actions challenging how the immigration service is administering 
portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act housed outside of part IV.108
At times, the line between part IV and other parts is not bright, as there are cases 
that involve interrelated actions authorized under and outside of part IV. 109  This raises 
the issue of when a court is restraining or enjoining the operation of part IV to trigger the 
limitations of section 1252(f)(1).  For example, the asylum benefit is authorized under 
part I.  It is possible, however, to seek asylum during a removal proceeding governed by 
part IV.  Similarly, adjustment of status to legal permanent resident is covered in part V, 
108 See, e.g., Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, 302 F. Supp.2d 1076 (D. Minn. 2004) (granting, 
without addressing section 1252(f)(1), partial summary judgment to class challenging 
immigration service procedures in adjudicating permanent residence applications of those 
granted asylum and challenging procedures used in issuing documentation of work 
authorization to those granted asylum).  
109
 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently noted that section 
1252(a)(2)(C) (which bars judicial review of orders against foreign nationals who have 
committed certain crimes), would bar review of the asylum application of a foreign 
national subject to removal, despite that section 1252 generally permits judicial review of 
asylum determinations.  In other words, the Third Circuit determined that the bar against 
judicial review of removal orders based on criminal conduct trumps the normal 
availability of judicial review of asylum determinations.  Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d 
414, 419 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004).
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but a foreign national may seek adjustment of status during a part IV removal proceeding 
in certain circumstances.110
The statute’s specific reference to part IV, instead of referring to the entire 
subchapter or the entire Immigration and Nationality Act, counteracts an interpretation 
that 1252(f)(1) is triggered any time part IV is implicated.111  Courts have implemented 
this reasoning.  For example, a class of individuals illegally residing in the United States 
who had prematurely filed adjustment of status applications sought to prevent the 
immigration service from using information in those applications to remove them from 
the United States.  The district court held that section 1252(f)(1) would not prevent the 
issuance of injunctive relief because the statute’s “own terms” restricted its scope to part 
IV.  The court interpreted the class claim before it as addressing the proper procedure for 
handling a prematurely filed application for adjustment of status, and concluded that 
those procedures are not found in part IV of subchapter II.112  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit 
110 See, e.g., Padilla v. Ridge, No. M-03-126 (S.D. Tex. March 31, 2004) (Order certifying 
class of foreign nationals challenging the immigration service’s practices in providing 
documentation of permanent resident status granted in removal proceedings).
111
 Section 1252(f)(1) contrasts with other sections of IIRIRA that do not restrict their 
reach to only one part of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  For example, section 
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) removes federal court jurisdiction over acts “the authority for which is 
specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” 
(emphasis added).  
112
 Ramos v. Ashcroft, No. 02-C-8266, 2004 WL 161520 at *6 (N.D. Ill. January 16, 
2004); see also North Jersey Media Group Inc., v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp.2d 288, 295 
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(en banc) held that section 1252(f)(1) did not preclude a preliminary injunction issued 
under a part other than part IV, even if the injunction affects an action arising under part 
IV.113
So far, the textual analysis of section 1252(f)(1) can reasonably lead to the 
conclusion that the statute does not block injunctions ordering the immigration service to 
implement the immigration laws in a different way, and also that the restrictions of 
section 1252(f)(1), whatever they may be, only narrowly apply to the actions specified in 
part IV, and not to those actions that may interact with part IV.  Returning to the class-
wide injunction in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, if courts adopt this interpretation of 
section 1252(f)(1), section 1252(f)(1), had it existed at the time, would not have affected 
the class-wide injunction issued in that case.  First, the injunction in Haitian Refugee 
Center v. Smith did not enjoin or restrain the “operation of” a statute (rather it affected 
how the immigration service implemented a statute).  Second, the injunction affected 
(D.N.J. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing that 
section 1252(f)(1) does not prohibit injunctions dealing with actions collateral to part IV); 
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp.2d 948, 955 (E.D. Mich. 2002), aff’d on other 
grounds, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (same).
113
 Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).  
Yes, this is the same Catholic Social Services class described supra notes 55 to 66. The 
original panel had held that the injunction ultimately interfered with actions related to 
part IV, and therefore section 1252(f)(1) barred injunctive relief.  Catholic Soc. Serv., 
Inc. v. INS, 182 F.3d 1053, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc, 232 F.3d 1139 (9th 
Cir. 2000).  
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asylum procedures authorized outside of part IV (even though some of the asylum 
procedures took place during a part IV removal hearing).  
b. The Connection to the Legalization Cases
The legalization cases help to decipher the text of section 1252(f)(1).  As 
explained above, the textual significance of the term “operation of” in section 1252(f)(1) 
is reminiscent of the textual significance of “a determination” in McNary.  Also, the 
distinction between injunctions that foreclose the operation of a statute and injunctions 
that remedy the unlawful administration of a statute is analogous to the 
procedural/substantive distinction emphasized by lower courts in applying McNary and 
Catholic Social Services.114  Perhaps, however, the connection between section 
1252(f)(1) and McNary and Catholic Social Services is more significant than analogy.
So far, the analysis of section 1252(f)(1) has not revealed any textual mention of 
class actions or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  It seems the assumption that section 
1252(f)(1) limits injunctive relief to individual actions only stems from a particular 
reading of the last phrase of section 1252(f)(1), which this article has not yet discussed.  
That last phrase reads “other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an 
individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.”  The 
reading that presumably leads to the conclusion that section 1252(f)(1) prohibits certain 
class-wide injunctions is that this phrase means that no court may enjoin or restrain the 
operation of part IV except in the context of an individual action.  But that is not the only 
114
 Lower courts recognized a distinction between challenges to the policies and 
procedures the immigration service used to administer the legalization program versus 
challenges to substantive determinations under the statute.  See supra note 69.
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possible reading of the section.  Catholic Social Services reminds us that a major issue in 
the legalization class action litigation was whether individuals deterred by the 
immigration service’s regulations could seek review, despite that the challenged 
regulation was never specifically applied to them.  The Supreme Court held in Catholic 
Social Services that individuals must feel the application of an immigration statute or 
regulation in some concrete way before that individual has standing to seek review.  
Looking through the lens of Catholic Social Services, it is interesting to re- look at section 
1252(f)(1).  
Again, the relevant last phrase states that no court may enjoin or restrain “other 
than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against 
whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.”  Could the aim of section 
1252(f)(1) simply be to thwart the ripeness issue of Catholic Social Services?  Perhaps 
section 1252(f)(1) can be satisfied, and a class-wide injunction may issue, as long as the 
class is comprised of individuals actually subjected to the application of a provision of 
part IV during removal proceedings.115  In other words, perhaps the statute does not limit 
injunctive relief to individual actions, but rather aims to limit injunctive relief to 
115
 The language of this last phrase of section 1252(f)(1) restricting the issuance of 
injunctive relief unless proceedings have already been initiated makes sense in this 
context.  This language describes the kinds of individuals who may obtain injunctive 
relief-- those “against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.”  This 
language also serves to emphasize that part IV is the only aim of the section, see supra 
notes 106-108, as the section limits injunctive relief to an individual alien in removal 
proceedings.
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individuals who have actually felt the application of the provision at issue.  After all, 
section 1252(f)(1) does not explicitly limit injunctive relief to “individual actions,” but 
rather limits injunctive relief to individuals subjected to the application of a provision and 
against whom proceedings have been initiated.
This interpretation of section 1252(f)(1) coincides with the nature of class actions 
generally.  A class action is a procedural device that allows for representative suits, 
relying on named plaintiffs to establish relevant statutory requirements.116  If an 
individual qualifying under section 1252(f)(1) seeks an injunction, the availability of 
injunctive relief should not depend on whether that individual is representing a class, 
unless, of course, Congress explicitly stated that it should.
The language of the section governing review of expedited removal decisions 
supports an interpretation that Congress did not expressly bar class-wide injunctions 
through the text of section 1252(f)(1).117  The expedited removal section instructs that 
“no court may—certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in 
proceedings involving the expedited removal scheme. 118  That clearer language is 
evidence that Congress knows how to include clear terms to eliminate the use of the class 
action device. Section 1252(f)(1), however, does not even contain any variation of the 
116 See ALBA CONTE AND HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §§1:1, 
1:2 (4th Ed. 2003).
117
 Referring to section 1252(e) to determine the meaning of section 1252(f)(1) is 
especially appropriate given that section 1252(f)(1) was enacted at the same time as 
section 1252(e), as both were entirely new subsections enacted by IIRIRA.
118
 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B).
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term “class,” nor does it mention Rule 23 in any way.119  The only term that can be 
interpreted to limit multi-party action is the use of the word “individual,” but, as 
explained above, the use of the term “individual” could be interpreted as limiting 
injunctive relief to those individuals who have felt the effects of the challenged provision, 
and not limiting injunctive relief to individual actions only. 
In the social security context, the Supreme Court held that a statute must contain a 
clear, express intent to exempt an action from a rule of civil procedure.120  The Supreme 
Court did not find “the necessary clear expression of congressional intent” to prohibit the 
use of the class action device in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).121  That section provided that “any 
individual” could obtain federal court review of certain social security administrative 
119
 If Congress intended the foreclosure of all class-wide relief, surely section 1252(f)(1) 
would contain language at least as comprehensive as section 1252(e).  Professor Volpp 
has argued that section 1252(f)(1) “nowhere addresses joinder, and only address relief.”  
Court Stripping and Class- Wide Relief, supra note 28,  at 471.  Professor Volpp has also 
argued that section 1252(f)(1) does not bar forms of relief other than injunctive.  Court 
Stripping and Class-Wide Relief, supra note 28, at 473-74; see also Neuman, Federal 
Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2 at 1684-85.  In the context of expedited 
removal, Congress wrote that no court may “enter declaratory, injunctive, or other 
equitable relief.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(A).  This specific listing of various types of 
relief emphasizes that section 1252(f)(1) only limits injunctive relief, and does not limit 
other types of relief. 
120
 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699-701 (1979).
121
 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 700.
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actions.122  Recognizing that “a wide variety of federal jurisdictional provisions speak in 
terms of individual plaintiffs,” the Court determined that the use of the phrase “any 
individual” was not a “necessary clear expression of congressional intent.”123  The Court 
explained that “it is not unusual that [§ 405(g)] . . . speaks in terms of an individual 
plaintiff, since the Rule 23 class-action device was designed to allow an exception to the 
usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties 
only.”124  Similar to section 405(g), section 1252(f)(1) refers to “an individual alien,” but 
contains no “necessary clear expression of congressional intent” to exempt immigration 
actions from Rule 23.
Congress’ inclusion of a broad restriction on types of relief and specific ban on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 actions in the expedited removal section stands in 
sharp contrast to section 1252(f)(1).  If Congress meant to bar all class-wide injunctive 
relief, why does section 1252(f)(1) contain the ambiguous reference to “individual” and 
contain no reference to Rule 23?  Perhaps the answer is that section 1252(f)(1) only bars 
injunctive relief to a class comprised of members with unripe claims. 
This reading of section 1252(f)(1)—that the statute does not block the issuance of 
class-wide injunctive relief if the class claims are ripe—receives additional support from 
the Supreme Court’s legalization opinions.  In McNary, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
if Congress had intended the legalization special judicial review provision to apply to 
every possible action, Congress could have used more explicit statutory language to 
122
 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 699 n.12.
123
 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 700.
124
 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 700-01.
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express that intent.125  Similarly, Congress could have used clearer language in section 
1252(f)(1), as it did in the expedited removal section, to indicate that it meant to bar 
class-wide injunctive relief.  Also, the Supreme Court in McNary relied on the strong 
presumption of judicial review of administrative action.126  These principles support the 
above reading of section 1252(f)(1).
c. The Role of the Serious Constitutional Problem
Scholars have commented on the Supreme Court’s evolving habit, in the 
immigration context and in other contexts, to avoid deciding cases on constitutional 
grounds in favor of resolving cases through statutory interpretation that buries the 
constitutional issue.127  This trend holds true in the context of immigration statutes 
125
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 494 (1991).
126
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 496.
127 See, e.g., Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty, supra note 2, at 2506-11; Hiroshi Motomura, 
The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:  Procedural Surrogates for Substantive 
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration 
Law After a Century of Plenary Power:  Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory 
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).  It is beyond the scope of this article to 
comment on the propriety of using statutory canons to interpret statutes in general or to 
evaluate their role in deciding cases in lieu of reaching constitutional holdings.  Likewise, 
this article will not discuss the pros and cons of different philosophies of statutory 
interpretation.  For discussion and analysis of such theories, see, for example, WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); NORMAN J. SINGER, 
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purporting to limit federal court review.  McNary, Catholic Social Services, American-
Arab and St. Cyr are all examples of this trend.128
At first glance, this trend appears to have little effect in the context of section 
1252(f)(1).  In St. Cyr, the Court faced a proposed interpretation of a statute that would 
have eliminated all avenues of federal court review of constitutional claims.  In the case
of 1252(f)(1), however, a broad reading is that no court (other than the Supreme Court) 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Chapter 48A (6th Ed. 2000) (collecting 
articles).
128
 In McNary and Catholic Social Services, the Court held that the special review 
provisions of the legalization program allowed for certain claims to be brought in the 
district court rather than address the issue of whether total preclusion of those claims in 
the federal courts would be constitutional.  Likewise, in St. Cyr, the Court held that 
IIRIRA did not preclude habeas jurisdiction, rather than address the issue of whether 
Congress could have constitutionally eliminated all federal court jurisdiction over certain 
claims. “[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly 
possible,’ we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.”  INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (citations omitted). Another recent example of this 
trend in the immigration context is Zadvydas v. Davis.  533 U.S. 678 (2001).  In 
Zadvydas, the Supreme Court interpreted a statute governing post-final order detention to 
include an implicit reasonable time limitation.  The Court interpreted the statute in such a 
manner because “serious constitutional concerns” would be raised if the statute permitted 
indefinite detention.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 682.
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may issue class-wide injunctive relief regarding anything that arguably relates to part IV.  
While this broad reading would no doubt amount to a substantial disruption of the status 
quo and would also eliminate an important method to challenge the behavior of the 
immigration service, individual injunctions would still be permitted, and the Supreme 
Court could still issue class-wide injunctive relief.129  Therefore, it is appropriate to 
question whether the Supreme Court would base its interpretation of section 1252(f)(1) to 
avoid a lurking serious constitutional problem.130
It is possible, however, that a broad reading of section 1252(f)(1) could trigger the 
potential deprivation of review that concerned the Court in McNary.131  In McNary, the 
129
 Professor Neuman has questioned the exact nature of the Supreme Court’s role created 
by section 1252(f)(1) and whether it “amount[s] to an improper exercise of original 
jurisdiction.”  Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1686. 
If the Supreme Court’s ability to issue injunctive relief under section 1252(f)(1) arises 
under its appellate jurisdiction, Professor Neuman has questioned whether the Supreme 
Court could issue injunctive relief upon appellate review of a lower court’s issuance of a 
form of relief other than injunctive.  Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 
supra note 2, at 1686.
130
 This question is related to, yet different from, the question whether the statute 
represents a constitutional exercise of Congressional power.  The question addressed here 
is whether anticipated constitutional issues would influence the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the meaning and effect of the statute.
131
 Section 1252(f)(1) could implicate other potential constitutional issues.  Professor 
Volpp has suggested that section 1252(f) could be challenged as violating Article III of 
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Supreme Court determined that individual actions based on the administrative record of a 
single hearing were an ineffective means to challenge a pattern or practice of the 
immigration service.  If injunctive relief is only available to individuals, but it is also 
impossible for individuals to effectively bring pattern and practice claims, can a court 
effectively address a pattern and practice claim under a broad reading of section 
1252(f)(1)?132
There are ample reasons to construe section 1252(f)(1) not to constrain the use of 
the class action device unless the class is comprised of individuals with unripe claims.133
Suppose, however, that a broad reading of section 1252(f)(1) is adopted.  As described 
above, St. Cyr cemented habeas corpus jurisdiction as a distinct method to access federal 
court review.  In the wake of St. Cyr, the next section discusses whether habeas corpus 
jurisdiction can preserve what section 1252(f)(1) may take away.
V. Habeas Jurisdiction and Immigration Class Actions
the Constitution, as well as violating notions of due process and equal protection.  Volpp, 
Court Stripping and Class- Wide Relief, supra note 28, at 475-77.  Another potential 
constitutional issue is whether Congress created a proper role for the Supreme Court in 
section 1252(f)(1).  See supra note 129.  The Court may be swayed to interpret section 
1252(f)(1) to eliminate the need to reach that issue.
132
 The potential deprivation of review is amplified if section 1252(f)(1) is interpreted to 
bar all types of class-wide relief.
133
 Of course, this class issue is relevant only if the “operation of” part IV is implicated.  
See supra notes 106-113.
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What if there existed a parallel universe where section 1252(f)(1) could be 
ignored?134  If section 1252(f)(1) proves to be a broad bar against class-wide injunctive 
relief, is there an alternative method to obtain such relief?  One possible alternative 
method is immigration class action litigation via habeas corpus jurisdiction.  As is 
described below, however, this alternative presents its own set of roadblocks.  
In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court based its decision that habeas corpus review 
survived IIRIRA on the absence of a clear statement precluding habeas review. 135  The 
134
 It is important to remember that there are provisions in section 1252 other than section 
1252(f)(1) that are problematic to immigration class actions, including section 
1252(b)(9).  Professor Motomura has argued that courts should allow pattern and practice 
litigation to proceed despite sections 1252(b)(9) and 1252(f)(1).  Motomura, Judicial 
Review In Immigration Cases After AADC, supra note 40, at 434-39; see supra note 77.  
He concludes that section 1252(b)(9) “probably does not supersede McNary.”  Judicial 
Review In Immigration Cases After AADC, supra note 40 at 437.  Professor Motomura’s 
article appeared before the Supreme Court’s opinion in St. Cyr.  This part will analyze 
whether the Court’s opinion in St. Cyr offers another possible method to maintain an 
immigration class action out of the reach of section 1252.
135 See supra note 87.  Senator Orrin Hatch recently introduced a bill, the “Fairness in 
Immigration Litigation Act,” that proposes to amend section 1252 to specify that every 
reference to the elimination or curtailment of judicial review in section 1252 also 
eliminates or curtails habeas review.  Fairness in Immigration Litigation Act, S. 2443, 
108th Cong. (2004).  The Hatch bill contains language that section 1252(a)(2) should not 
“be construed as precluding consideration by the circuit courts of appeals of 
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absence of specific mention of habeas jurisdiction is crucial, according to the Court, 
because “in the immigration context, ‘judicial review’ and ‘habeas corpus’ have 
historically distinct meanings.”136  Because IIRIRA did not eliminate habeas jurisdiction, 
the Court held that a district court could hear, via the independent realm of habeas 
jurisdiction, claims that section 1252 would otherwise bar.137
a. The Reach of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 After INS v. St. Cyr
constitutional claims or pure questions of law raised upon petitions for review filed in 
accordance with this section.” S. 2443 at §2(a)(1)(A).  The Hatch bill also provides that 
petitions for review filed under section 1252 “shall be the sole and exclusive means of 
raising any and all claims with respect to orders of removal.” S. 2443 at § 2(a)(1)(B).  
This bill does not, however, address the problem faced by pattern and practice litigants, 
as the petition for review process established by section 1252 may never grant them 
adequate review of their claims.  As explained in McNary, the administrative record of an 
individual proceeding may not be sufficient to support a pattern or practice claim.  See 
supra notes 47-49.
136
 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 311 (2001).  In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court specifically 
reviewed IIRIRA sections 1252(a)(1), 1252(a)(2)(C), and 1252(b)(9) to determine 
whether those sections contained a “clear and unambiguous statement of Congress’ intent 
to bar [habeas] petitions.”  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308, 310-11. 
137
 Specifically, in St. Cyr the Supreme Court held that a district court could review, via a 
habeas petition, the legal challenges of a foreign national with a criminal history despite 
section 1252 (a)(2)(C), which forbids judicial review of the removal orders of certain 
foreign nationals with criminal histories.
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A reasonable question following St. Cyr is whether section 1252 contains limits 
that only apply to petitions for review, but not to petitions for habeas corpus. 138  After St.
Cyr, individual habeas actions are now permissible despite that section 1252 would bar 
judicial review of the same action.  If section 1252(f)(1) is interpreted to broadly bar 
class-wide relief, could a court issue that same relief in the context of a habeas class 
action?  
Because the Court in St. Cyr specifically examined only three provisions of 
section 1252 (sections 1252(a)(1), 1252(a)(2)(C), and 1252(b)(9)), courts have analyzed, 
post St. Cyr, whether other provisions of section 1252 affect habeas review.139  Therefore, 
a court might examine whether the restrictions of section 1252(f)(1) would apply to a 
habeas action, despite St. Cyr.  A court determining whether the restrictions of section 
1252(f)(1) would apply to a habeas action will likely analyze two issues.  First, the court 
will likely consider whether section 1252(f)(1) itself bars habeas review.  If not, it would 
138
 If section 1252 applies only to judicial review, then a habeas class action would not be 
subject to any of the provisions in section 1252.  This would be an important benefit of 
styling an action as a habeas class action.  Not only would section 1252(f)(1) not apply, 
but also the timing provision of section 1252(b)(9), which allows for judicial review of 
final administrative orders only, would not apply.  However, the practical effect of the 
restrictions against review of discretionary actions contained in section 1252 (§§ 
1252(a)(2)(B) and 1252(g), for example) may independently exist in the habeas realm.  
As described infra notes 175-183, courts have held that review of discretionary actions is 
not permissible under habeas jurisdiction.
139 See infra notes 142-153.
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likely consider whether the restrictions of section 1252(f)(1) apply both to judicial review 
and to habeas actions.140
Regarding the first issue, similar to the specific subsections referenced in St. Cyr, 
section 1252(f)(1) also contains no clear and unambiguous statement of Congress’ intent 
to abolish habeas review.  Again, in St. Cyr the Court specifically required that “[f]or [the 
immigration service] to prevail it must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of 
judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear 
statement of Congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”141  While the 
government may argue that the language of section 1252(f)(1) is distinct enough from the 
sections considered in St. Cyr to justify a holding that section 1252(f)(1) does bar habeas 
review,142 such an argument contradicts the Supreme Court’s clear statement requirement 
established in St. Cyr. 
140
 Courts of appeals have employed this two-step analysis to determine whether section 
1252(d), which requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, applies to habeas 
proceedings.  See infra notes 150-153.
141
 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298.
142
 The government has argued, subsequent to St. Cyr, that parts of section 1252, other 
than those specifically considered in St. Cyr, bar habeas review.  For example, courts 
have applied the reasoning of St. Cyr to hold that section 1252(g) (which was not directly 
at issue in St. Cyr) does not bar habeas review.  See, e.g., Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65, 
71 (1st Cir. 2002) (“In light of St. Cyr, [the immigration service’s] principal argument—
that section 1252(g) forecloses the exercise of habeas jurisdiction . . . is a dead letter”).  
Similarly, five courts of appeal have examined the language of the statute implementing 
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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Demore v. Kim further supports the 
argument that section 1252(f)(1) does not contain a clear statement eliminating habeas 
corpus review.  Applying the clear statement principles it emphasized in St. Cyr, the 
Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (which governs “judicial review” of claims 
challenging detention during removal proceedings) did not bar habeas review.143  The 
language of section 1226(e) reads: “The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment 
regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review.  No court may set 
aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the 
detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.”  
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, argued in her dissent that the 
“[n]o court may set aside any action or decision” language of section 1226(e) is sufficient 
to repeal habeas jurisdiction, especially because the text of the statutory subsections at 
the Convention Against Torture in light of St. Cyr and have concluded that it also does 
not contain an express revocation of habeas jurisdiction.  Cadet v. Bulger, ___ F.3d ___, 
No. 03-14565, 2004 WL 1615619 at *6-7 (11th Cir. July 20, 2004); Saint Fort v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 202 (1st Cir. 2003); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 141 (2d 
Cir. 2003); Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 2003); Ogbudimkpa v. 
Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 209 (3d Cir. 2003). No court has addressed whether section 
1252(f)(1) eliminates habeas jurisdiction. 
143
 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
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issue in St. Cyr all specifically mentioned the term “judicial review,” and the provision at 
issue in Demore v. Kim does not.144
The language of the text of section 1252(f)(1) also does not mention the term 
“judicial review” and, similar to the statute in Demore v. Kim, states, “Regardless of the 
nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, 
no court . . . shall have jurisdiction or authority to.”  Yet, the majority of the Court 
remained firm in its clear statement requirement in Demore v. Kim, finding no “explicit 
provision barring habeas review” in the similar language of section 1226(e).145  It seems 
likely that the Supreme Court will not find a clear statement in section 1252(f)(1) 
sufficient to signal the elimination of habeas jurisdiction.  
The resolution of the second inquiry, whether the restrictions of section 1252(f)(1) 
are applicable to habeas actions, is more complicated.  The historical separation of 
judicial review from habeas jurisdiction supports an argument that section 1252(f)(1) is 
of no effect in the habeas realm.  Section 1252(f)(1) is a part of the judicial review 
program established by section 1252, and in St. Cyr the Court held that review-limiting 
provisions of section 1252 did not apply to habeas actions.  It is uncertain, however, 
whether courts will directly adopt this argument in the context of section 1252(f)(1). 
144
 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 534-35 (2003) (O’Conner, J., dissenting).  While the title 
of section 1226(e) contains the term “judicial review,” Justice O’Conner commented that 
statutory titles do not per se control the meaning of statutory text.  Id. at 535.
145
 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 517.  Section 1252(f)(1) does contain the additional 
language “regardless of the nature of the action,” but this statement does not explicitly 
mention habeas review.  
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Courts are currently facing the challenge of balancing the autonomous nature of 
the habeas realm with the restrictions of section 1252.  For example, the Ninth Circuit 
applied section 1252(f)(1) to a habeas action but did not first discuss whether section 
1252(f)(1) plays any role in a habeas action. 146  Also, courts have struggled to define the 
proper role of section 1252(g) in a habeas action.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit determined that, even after St. Cyr, section 1252(g) forbids habeas review of a 
challenge of a decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal 
orders.147  The Ninth Circuit determined that section 1252(g) itself does not bar habeas 
146
 Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003).  The Ninth Circuit determined that 
section 1252(f)(1) did not preclude any relief because the “operation of” part IV was not 
challenged.  See supra note 97.
147
 Sharif v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2002) (determining that St. Cyr “does 
not disturb the holding of [Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee] that 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) blocks review in the district court of particular kinds of administrative 
decisions”); see also Latu v. Ashcroft, ___ F.3d ___, No. 03-1215, 2004 WL 1551593 at 
*5 (10th Cir. July 12, 2004) (acknowledging that section 1252(g) “does not strip the 
district court of § 2241 habeas jurisdiction,” but incorporating section 1252(g) into its 
decision that discretionary acts are not reviewable via habeas jurisdiction).  The Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has also concluded that section 1252(g) applies to a habeas 
action, but in an unpublished opinion.  Mendez v. Johnson, No. 03-5194, 2004 WL 
1088249 at *1 (6th Cir. May 12, 2004); but see, e.g., Wallace v. Reno, 194 F.3d 279, 285 
(1st Cir. 1999) (stating, in a decision that pre-dates St. Cyr, that the court is “unwilling to 
read section [1252(g)] as depriving the court of authority to issue traditional ancillary 
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jurisdiction (the first inquiry described above), but in doing so emphasized that the class 
before the court was not seeking review of a discretionary act (thus applying the 
substance of section 1252(g)).148  Also, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
discussed section 1252(g) in support of its conclusion that review of discretionary acts is 
not cognizable under habeas jurisdiction.149
relief needed to protect its authority to issue the writ [of habeas corpus]” and that “[t]o 
maintain habeas in the face of section [1252(g)], but deny the ancillary relief needed to 
make it meaningful, would be to strain at the gnat after swallowing the camel”); Foroglou 
v. Reno, 241 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining in a decision issued before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr that the reasoning of Wallace applies only when a 
habeas petitioner has no other available forum for judicial review).
148
 Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2003).  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
because a discretionary determination was not at issue, section 1252(g) would not apply, 
yet left open (but did not address) the possibility that section 1252(g) could bar a habeas 
action if a discretionary action were at issue.  For similar analysis, see Jama v. INS, 329 
F.3d 630, 632-33 (8th Cir. 2003), cert granted, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1407 (2004).  
The District Court in Ali had more definitively stated that section 1252(g) “does not limit 
judicial review on a petition for writ of habeas corpus,” and concluded that the section is 
not applicable to habeas actions.  Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D. 390, 398 (W.D. Wash. 
2003).
149
 Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2002). An alternative approach is to base the 
conclusion that habeas review does not extend to review of discretionary acts solely in 
habeas jurisprudence, and not to use section 1252 to support the decision.  See also Latu 
v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 1551593 at *5 (employing similar analysis to that used in Liu).
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Additionally, at least four courts of appeals have held that section 1252(d), which 
requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before “a court may review a final order 
of removal,” applies to habeas actions despite St. Cyr.150  These courts rejected the 
argument that the word “review” as used in section 1252(d) refers only to “judicial 
review,” and does not encompass habeas review.  Distinguishing section 1252(d) from 
the provisions of section 1252 at issue in St. Cyr, these courts determined that section 
1252(d) does not eliminate jurisdiction wholesale and only sets a condition on 
jurisdiction.151  Because only a condition on jurisdiction is implicated, the courts 
reasoned, section 1252(d), as applied to habeas review, does not present a substantial 
constitutional question.152  According to this reasoning, the absence of a substantial 
constitutional question allows the term “review” in section 1252(d) to encompass both 
judicial review and habeas review.153
150
 Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2004); Theodoropoulos v. INS, 358 F.3d 
162, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (petition for cert. filed); Duvall v. Elwood, 336 F.3d 228, 233-34 
(3d Cir. 2003); Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d 1320, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 531 (2003).  
151 See, e.g., Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d at 1324-25; Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d at 940-41.
152 See, e.g., Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d at 1324-25; Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d at 939.
153
 Courts have also considered the effect of section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (which bars review 
of certain discretionary acts) on habeas jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Jeanty v. Bulger, 204 F. 
Supp.2d 1366, 1373-74 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff’d sub nom., Moise v. Bulger, 321 F.3d 1336 
(2003) (per curiam), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 562 (2003) (determining that 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar habeas review); Sierra v. INS, 258 F.3d 1213, 
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Setting aside a discussion of the soundness of the legal analysis employed by 
these courts of appeals, the question arises whether courts will follow this mode of 
analysis with regard to section 1252(f)(1).  If so, the relevant determination is whether 
section 1252(f)(1) is more akin to those provisions at issue in St. Cyr (eliminating 
jurisdiction) or more akin to section 1252(d) (setting a condition on jurisdiction).  The 
answer is most likely linked to the resolution of the issue raised earlier, whether there is a 
serious constitutional problem lurking in section 1252(f)(1).154  A likely government 
argument is that section 1252(f)(1) bars only a form of relief, and therefore does not bar 
jurisdiction altogether.  The counter-argument is that section 1252(f)(1), if interpreted 
broadly, could bar meaningful review of pattern and practice claims, and therefore should 
not apply to habeas actions.
b. Challenges Facing Habeas Class Actions
Even if the restrictions of section 1252(f)(1) do not apply in the habeas context, 
are habeas class actions a viable alternative to non-habeas class actions?  Habeas class 
actions face their own set of roadblocks.  For example, a habeas class action is not 
identical to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class action and may be subject to more 
1217 (10th Cir. 2001) (same).  Similarly, courts have addressed the effect of section 
1252(b)(5) (which addresses judicial review of nationality claims).  See, e.g., Lee v. 
Ashcroft, No. 01-CV-0997, 2003 WL 21310247 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2003) 
(determining that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) does not bar a habeas action); Gomez v. Bureau 
of Immigration and Custom Enforcement, 315 F. Supp.2d 630, 634 (M.D. Pa. 2004) 
(same).
154 See supra notes 127-132.
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stringent requirements.  Further, the maintenance of a habeas class action depends on a 
custody requirement.155  Other issues are whether the scope of habeas review allows a 
court to review the challenged behavior and whether habeas review allows a court to 
grant the requested relief.  
While courts have adopted the class action device in habeas actions, habeas class 
actions are not identical to Rule 23 class actions.  The Ninth Circuit recently approved the 
use of Rule 23 to govern a habeas immigration class action,156 and courts have allowed 
155
 The relevant habeas statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which provides that a writ of habeas 
corpus may not be granted unless a “prisoner” is “in custody,” among other requirements.  
For an in-depth discussion of the history of the writ of habeas corpus in the immigration 
context, see Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal 
of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961 (1998).
156
 Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 890-91 (9th Cir. 2003).  See also Kazarov v. Achim, 
No. 02-C-5097, 2003 WL 22956006 at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. December 12, 2003) (certifying, 
under Rule 23(b)(2), class challenging detention procedures).  For pre-IIRIRA 
immigration habeas class actions, see, for example, Bertrand v. Vigile, 535 F. Supp. 
1020, 1024-25 (S.D.N.Y 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(approving certification of class of Haitian foreign national detainees challenging the 
exercise of discretionary authority with respect to release on parole); but see, for 
example, Wang v. Reno, 862 F. Supp. 801, 811 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (declining to create 
habeas class of foreign nationals challenging asylum decisions because, among other 
things, too many individual issues were present).  
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habeas class actions in non-immigration contexts.157  Courts have explained, however, 
that Rule 23 does not strictly govern habeas class actions.  As the Ninth Circuit observed 
in Ali v. Ashcroft, courts have looked to Rule 23 for guidance in adjudicating habeas class 
actions, and have even applied the provisions of Rule 23 to determine whether to certify a 
habeas class, but technically Rule 23 does not apply to habeas proceedings.158  Courts 
have emphasized that a habeas class action is only a case management option available to 
federal courts, not a form of litigation authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.159  Also, courts sitting in habeas jurisdiction may apply a tougher version of 
157 See, e.g., Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1976) (affirming certification 
of habeas class of state prisoners); Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 1975) 
(partially affirming certification of class of federal prisoners); Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 
1115, 1126-27 (2d Cir. 1974) (approving of certification of habeas class of state 
prisoners); Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 1973) (reversing district 
court conclusion that a habeas class action could never be appropriate).  See also RANDY 
HERTZ AND JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 1-11 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §11.4(b) (4th Ed. 2003); ALBA CONTE AND HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 8 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §25:28 (4th Ed. 2003).
158 Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 890-91 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Sero, 506 F.2d at 1125 
and Bijeol, 513 F.2d at 968).
159
 Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d at 1125.  According to the Second Circuit in Sero, while the 
class action device as governed by Rule 23 may not be directly imported into habeas 
actions, federal courts do have the power to create procedural devices in habeas actions 
that borrow from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id. at 1125.  In Sero, the Second 
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the Rule 23 requirements.160  Therefore, meeting the requirements of Rule 23 is not a 
guarantee that a federal court will agree to hear a habeas action as a class action.
If a court agrees to borrow the class action device and apply it to a habeas class 
action, the habeas custody requirement presents a further challenge.  One issue is whether 
the named plaintiff is “in custody.”  Another issue is who is the proper custodian in an 
immigration habeas case.  
Addressing the second issue first, the identity of the proper custodian is important 
because the geographical scope of a putative habeas immigration class injunction is only 
as wide as the court’s jurisdiction over the proper custodian. A narrow view of the 
identity of the proper custodian could diminish the potential effectiveness of a habeas 
class to rectify a widely implemented practice or policy of the immigration service.161  If 
Circuit explained that “the unusual circumstance” of the case was a “compelling 
justification for allowing a multi-party proceeding similar to the class action authorized 
by the Rules of Civil Procedure.”  Id. at 1125.  See also Bertrand v. Vigile, 535 F. Supp. 
1020, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (explaining that “a federal court may permit multi-party 
habeas actions similar to the class actions authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure 
when the nature of the claim so requires.”) (emphasis added).
160 See, e.g., Bertrand v. Vigile, 535 F. Supp. at 1025 (recognizing that a more stringent 
form of the commonality prerequisite of Rule 23 may be applied in habeas class actions).  
161 See Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 507 (3d Cir. 1994) (refusing to certify nationwide 
habeas class of immigrant detainees based on custodian issue); Wang v. Reno, 862 F. 
Supp. 801, 811-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (refusing to certify subclass based on custodian 
issue).
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the proper custodian is the warden of one specific detention center where a foreign 
national is detained, then a district court’s reach is limited to that custodian, and any 
injunction could only reach those held by that specific custodian.  If, however, the proper 
custodian were a national official, such as the Attorney General, then a district court 
would have potential nationwide jurisdiction over all those class members under the 
custody of the Attorney General.162
Courts have disagreed over who is the proper custodian in an immigration habeas 
action.163  The Supreme Court recently declined to reach the issue “whether the Attorney 
162
 For further discussion of the issue of who is the proper custodian in an immigration 
habeas action, see Megan A. Ferstenfeld-Torres, “Who are We to Name?  The 
Applicability of the ‘Immediate-Custodian-as-Respondent’ Rule to Alien Habeas Claims 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,” 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 431 (2003); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, “Is 
the Attorney General the Custodian of an INS Detainee?  Personal Jurisdiction and the 
‘Immediate Custodian’ Rule in Immigration-Related Habeas Actions,” 27 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 543 (2001/2002); Brian O’Donoghue, Who’s the Boss?: Armentero, 
Padilla, and the Proper Respondent in Federal Habeas Corpus Law, 22 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 441 (2004) (student note).  See also Lenni B. Benson, The New World of 
Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 260-63 (1998). 
163
 See, e.g. Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 887-888 (2003) (determining that the Attorney 
General is the proper custodian due to his unique role in immigration proceedings and 
also because of the “legal reality” of control of immigration detainees (that they are 
frequently transferred all over the country)); Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 194 F. Supp.2d 368, 
376 (D.N.J. 2002) (holding that the Attorney General is a proper respondent in an 
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General is a proper respondent to a habeas petition filed by an alien detained pending 
deportation” in Rumsfeld v. Padilla.164  The Court did hold that when present physical 
confinement is challenged, the only proper respondent is the immediate custodian and 
that jurisdiction lies only in the district of confinement.165  The Court further explained 
that “a habeas petitioner who challenges a form of ‘custody’ other than present physical 
confinement may name as respondent the entity or person who exercises legal control 
with respect to the challenged ‘custody.’”166  Under Padilla, a court would have ample 
reason to limit any habeas class-wide relief affecting present physical confinement to 
those under the control of the immediate custodian.
immigration habeas action in the circumstance where a detainee is transferred, after the 
filing of a habeas action, to a facility outside the jurisdiction of the original district court); 
but see, e.g., Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d at 507 (concluding that the habeas custodian is the 
warden of the prison where the detainee is held in the context of a putative nationwide 
class action of immigrant detainees); Wang v. Reno, 862 F. Supp. at 811-12 (refusing to 
certify a class partially comprised of immigrant detainees housed outside of the district 
based on the conclusion that the warden of each specific facility is the custodian for 
habeas purposes); see also Rosenbloom and Ferstenfeld-Torres, supra note 162, for a 
thorough discussion of the conflict among the courts regarding this issue.
164
 ___ U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2711 n.8 (2004).  In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, a United States 
citizen challenged his custody based on his designation as an enemy combatant.  ___ U.S. 
___, 124 S. Ct. at 2715.
165
 ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2723.
166
 ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2720.
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The first issue involves the question of who is “in custody” to satisfy the 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.167  The determination is inherently case-specific, but 
an important point is that actual physical restraint may not be required to meet the “in 
custody” requirement.  For example, whatever exactly constitutes “in custody,” a habeas 
petitioner need only be “in custody” at the time the habeas petition is filed.168  For 
example, courts have held that the physical removal of an individual from the United 
States does not prevent the custody requirement from being met as long as the individual 
was “in custody” at the time of filing.169  However, the Supreme Court has determined 
that while release does not break the “in custody” requirement, every habeas case must 
still satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III, section 2 of the 
167
 For more in-depth discussion of this issue in the immigration context, see Peter 
Bibring, Jurisdictional Issues In Post-Removal Habeas Challenges to Orders of Removal, 
17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 135, 150-80 (2002); Alison Leal Parker, In Through the Out Dorr?  
Retaining Judicial Review for Deported Lawful Permanent Resident Aliens, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 605, 633-37 (2001) (student note). 
168
 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 297 
(5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has made it clear that the ‘in 
custody’ determination is made at the time the habeas petition is filed”) (quoting Spencer 
v. Kemna, 523 U.S. at 7); Lopez v. Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507, 510 (8th Cir. 2003).
169 See, e.g., Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d at 297; Chong v. District Director, INS, 264 
F.3d 378, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2001); Reyes-Sanchez v. Ashcroft, 261 F. Supp.2d 276, 282-83 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
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Constitution.170  Therefore, it is possible that release could moot the case underlying the 
habeas petition even if it does not technically break the “in custody” requirement.171
The requirement that a habeas petitioner be “in custody” at least at the time of 
filing the petition limits the range of patterns and practices that could be challenged via a 
habeas class action.  Earlier this article discussed three major groups of immigration class 
170
 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. at 7.  In Spencer, the Supreme Court determined that a 
prisoner’s completion of his sentence mooted his habeas petition challenging the 
revocation of his parole.  The Court did not recognize any actual injury likely to be 
addressed by the habeas action. 
171
 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1.  See Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d at 292 (relying on 
Spencer to determine that a habeas case is not moot where the petitioner was deported but 
faces a bar to reentry to the United States); Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 395 
(6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub. nom., Snyder v. Rosales-Garcia, 539 U.S. 941 (2003) 
(acknowledging Spencer but determining that a live case or controversy existed where 
individuals with final orders of removal were released on parole pending removal); 
Chong v. District Director, 264 F.3d at 383-85 (holding that deportation of habeas 
petitioner did not render petition moot because the petitioner’s deportation carried the 
collateral consequence of a bar against reentering the United States and stating that the 
exceptions to the general mootness doctrine apply in the habeas context); but see, Patel v. 
US Attorney General, 334 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (determining that restrictions 
on returning to the United States are not sufficient restraints to satisfy the habeas “in 
custody” requirement in the context of a habeas petition filed after removal).  See also
Parker, supra note 167 (discussing post-removal standing issues).
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actions of the past:  those challenging immigration detention; those challenging the way 
the immigration service implements a benefit program; and those actions challenging the 
immigration service’s procedures employed in removing foreign nationals from the 
United States.172  Of the three groups, those actions challenging immigration detention 
clearly face the least difficulty regarding the “in custody” requirement.  The custody 
requirement presents a greater roadblock to the other two groups, as those actions may or 
may not involve actual physical custody at some point.
Even if a court agrees to recognize a habeas class action and the “in custody” 
requirement is satisfied, the class claim must be cognizable under habeas jurisdiction.  
After St. Cyr, courts are presently considering what types of claims are appropriate for 
habeas review.173
172 See supra notes 19-27.
173
 Another post-St. Cyr issue is whether habeas jurisdiction is available to those who 
could also seek relief under section 1252.  At least three courts of appeals have held that 
foreign nationals may bring habeas actions even if judicial review is also available under 
section 1252.  Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2001); Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d 
36 (2d Cir. 2002); Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2002).  In Chmakov, the Third 
Circuit specifically held that habeas review of an application for asylum was permissible, 
even though judicial review of asylum determinations is permitted under section 1252. 
The petitioners in Chmakov had failed to file a timely petition for judicial review.  
Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d at 212-13.  The Third Circuit reasoned that while no 
suspension clause problem would exist if Congress had removed habeas jurisdiction for 
those with some other avenue of federal court review, “it is now beyond dispute” that 
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Courts have determined that the substantive scope of habeas review after St. Cyr
does not replenish all of the review carved out by IIRIRA.174   For example, the First,175
Congress did not explicitly foreclose habeas jurisdiction in IIRIRA.  Id. at 214.  The 
Third Circuit rejected the immigration service’s arguments that Congress need only 
provide a clear statement to repeal habeas jurisdiction if a suspension clause problem is 
present and that IIRIRA does contain a clear statement to abolish habeas review for 
foreign nationals without criminal convictions.  Id. at 214-15.  The Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit has disagreed with the Chmakov reasoning, holding that when judicial 
review under section 1252 is available, habeas review is not also available.  Lopez v. 
Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507, 510-11 (8th Cir. 2003).  Also, the Ninth Circuit has dismissed 
habeas petitions based on the principle of exhaustion of judicial remedies (i.e. failure to 
file a timely petition for review under section 1252), and has denied to re-hear en banc a 
case where the original panel used the doctrine of issue preclusion to prevent 
consideration of an issue on habeas originally presented in a section 1252 petition for 
review. Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004) (exhaustion of judicial 
remedies); Acevedo-Carranza v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); 
Nunes v. Ashcroft, ___ F.3d ___, No. 02-55613, 2004 WL 1516777 at *1 (9th Cir. July 8, 
2004) (issue preclusion).  
174
 Another developing issue is the scope of relief available in a habeas action.  While a 
habeas class action may avoid the restrictions on relief of section 1252(f)(1), a habeas 
class action is inherently limited to the relief that is available in a habeas action. The Fifth 
Circuit recently held that under habeas review the only relief a district court may grant is 
relief necessary to undo restraints on liberty.  Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292 (5th 
Cir. 2004).  In Zalawadia, the government deported the habeas petitioner before the 
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Supreme Court issued its decision in St. Cyr, despite that the petitioner also argued that 
IIRIRA should not apply retroactively.  Id. at 295-96.  The Supreme Court remanded Mr. 
Zalawadia’s case in light of St. Cyr.  On remand, Mr. Zalawadia sought a determination, 
under the pre-IIRIRA standard, whether he is entitled to a deportation waiver.  The Fifth 
Circuit refused to order the determination, and concluded that the only appropriate relief 
is to vacate the illegal deportation order. Id. at 298-99.  The dissent objected that that 
relief is inadequate because it does not remove all of the collateral effects of the illegal 
deportation order.  According to the dissent, Mr. Zalawadia, now deported, will never be 
able to obtain a waiver determination under the pre-IIRIRA standard, a determination that 
he was entitled to at the time of his deportation proceeding.  Id. at 303 (Wiener, J. 
dissenting).  According to the majority, habeas “cannot be used to bootstrap other claims 
for relief” and “is not a tool that can be broadly employed to restore the habeas petitioner 
to his or her status quo ante beyond freeing him from the restraints on liberty arising 
directly from the illegal order of judgment.” Id. at 300.
175
 Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2002).  The Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held that a claim that the immigration service failed to exercise any discretion is 
not cognizable under habeas jurisdiction where the foreign national has no statutory right 
to any discretionary process.  Id. at 71.  The First Circuit distinguished Mr. Carranza’s 
claims from those in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), 
where the Supreme Court held that a foreign national could state a claim under habeas 
jurisdiction that the immigration service failed to implement a statutorily-granted 
discretionary process.  Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d at 68-69.
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Second,176 Third, 177 Fourth,178 Fifth,179 Ninth180 and Eleventh181 Circuits have all 
determined that habeas review is available (after St. Cyr and IIRIRA) only to address 
176
 Sol v. INS, 274 F.3d 648, 651 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the scope of habeas review 
does not extend to review of the immigration service’s discretionary determinations, 
including whether administrative decisions lack adequate support from the record, which 
would involve a reconsideration of evidence).
177
 Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d 414, 420-21 (3d Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the scope 
of habeas review that survived IIRIRA is no greater than the traditional scope of habeas 
review, which did not include review of discretionary acts).
178
 Bowrin v. US INS, 194 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 1999).  In this pre-St. Cyr decision, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the conclusion ultimately reached by the 
Supreme Court in St. Cyr—that habeas jurisdiction survived IIRIRA.  Id. at 488-89.  The 
court further stated that the habeas jurisdiction that survived IIRIRA was not broad 
enough to encompass review of factual or discretionary issues.  Id. at 490.
179
 Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court’s 
determination that habeas jurisdiction does not allow review of an immigration judge’s 
discretionary determination that a United States citizen child would not suffer extreme 
hardship if deported with his parents).
180
 Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 298 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2002).  In Guitierrez-Chavez, the 
Ninth Circuit held that habeas review is not available to examine the “equitable balance” 
reached by the immigration service in determining whether a foreign national is entitled 
to relief from removal. Id. at 829.  The court also stated, however, that jurisdiction could 
lie under 8 U.S.C. § 2241 to review a claim that an impermissible process was employed 
in reaching a discretionary decision.  Id. at 829.
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constitutional and statutory issues, and not to challenge discretionary determinations.  
These courts of appeals have sanctioned the use of habeas jurisdiction to address pure 
questions of law, including constitutional and statutory challenges, but have refused to 
allow habeas jurisdiction to encompass review of whether administrative decisions in a 
particular case amount to an abuse of discretion or to challenge underlying factual 
determinations.182  A few courts, however, have held that review of constitutional or 
181
 Cadet v. Bulger, ___ F.3d ___, No. 03-14565, 2004 WL 1615619 at *8 (11th Cir. July 
20, 2004) (recognizing that no court of appeals has ruled that review of discretionary acts 
is appropriate via habeas jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held 
that the “scope of habeas review available in § 2241 petitions by aliens challenging 
removal orders (1) includes constitutional issues and errors of law, including both 
statutory interpretations and application of law to undisputed or adjudicated facts, and (2) 
does not include review of administrative fact findings or the exercise of discretion”).
182 See, e.g., Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d 414, 420 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
“habeas proceedings do not embrace review of the exercise of discretion, or the 
sufficiency of the evidence.”  For an argument that habeas review may properly 
encompass review of discretionary acts, see Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty, supra note 2, 
at 2503-05.  A related issue is whether habeas jurisdiction is appropriate to review a 
discretionary act that is guided by a statutory framework.  For example, in an unpublished 
opinion, the Third Circuit determined that habeas jurisdiction allows review an 
immigration-related discretionary act subject to statutory limits.  Togbah v. Ashcroft, No. 
03-1753, 2004 WL 1530494 at *1 n.1 (3d Cir. July 8, 2004) (citing Spencer Enterprises, 
Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 690 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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statutory issues includes review of whether law was applied correctly to undisputed 
facts.183  The restriction of habeas review to statutory and constitutional issues is 
probably not debilitating to pattern and practice cases, as such actions are likely to 
present statutory and constitutional challenges.  For example, the plaintiff class in Haitian 
Refugee Center v. Smith raised constitutional challenges. 
In summary, obtaining class-wide injunctive relief in a habeas class action 
(assuming, of course, that section 1252(f)(1) bars such relief in a non-habeas action and 
also assuming that the class succeeds on the merits) faces many hurdles, including:  (1) 
satisfying the “in custody” requirement; (2) obtaining a determination that the proper 
custodian is an official who has custody over enough foreign nationals to make any class-
wide injunction effective; (3) winning the district court’s agreement that the class action 
device should be imported to the particular habeas case; (4) satisfying the requirements 
imposed by the district court judge (likely borrowed from Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23) and (5) presenting claims reviewable in a habeas action. 
183
 Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that habeas 
review is permissible where a petitioner claims that a law is wrongly applied in an 
immigration administrative proceeding); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 142-43 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (determining that the “Constitution requires habeas review to extend to claims 
of erroneous application or interpretation of statutes,” and holding that habeas review is 
proper over a claim that the Board of Immigration Appeals wrongly applied the 
Convention Against Torture to the facts of a case); see also Cadet v. Bulger, 2004 WL 
1615619 at *8.
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VI. Conclusion
As the above illustrates, the availability of class-wide injunctive relief in the 
immigration context is currently uncertain.  The source of the uncertainty, 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(f)(1), upon close review, is self-limiting in several ways.  Courts may fairly 
interpret the statute to limit injunctive relief against the operation of limited statutory 
provisions, but injunctive relief is not against the operation of those provisions if it seeks 
to correct the way the immigration service is implementing those provisions.  Close 
review of the section also reveals that the assumption that Congress expressly intended 
the section to restrict the use of the class action device in the immigration context may be 
incorrect.  If, however, the statute is interpreted to broadly bar class-wide injunctive 
relief, habeas jurisdiction is a problematic alternative method to obtain that relief.  
Remembering the injunction issued in response to the experience of the asylum 
applicants in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, this article ends with the question posed 
earlier:  What if the federal courts had no power to issue such class-wide relief?  What if 
the federal courts could not issue class-wide injunctive relief ordering the immigration 
service to stop or to correct unconstitutional practices or procedures?  This article 
reserves the question of the constitutionality of section 1252(f)(1) in favor of focusing on 
the meaning and effect of the section.  The Supreme Court’s future interpretation of this 
specific section, especially if the Court interprets the section as broadly barring the 
federal courts from issuing class-wide injunctive relief in immigration cases, may re-
ignite the more general debate addressing congressional power to limit federal court 
jurisdiction.  The resolution of the meaning and effect of section 1252(f)(1) will certainly 
establish precedent that will permanently affect that debate.
